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ABSTRACT
THE RESPONSE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
TO CREDIT STIMULI
Denise Williams Streeter 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Co-Directors: Dr. Mohammed Najand 
Dr. John Griffith
This dissertation calls upon the theory of financial intermediation (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983) and the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995) to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars of 
innovations to stimulate the credit markets during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Specifically, loan-level data is used to conduct univariate, regression, and event-study 
analyses to address the research question of, “Did United States- and European Union- 
based commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending 
during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 when 
compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 
five years prior?”.
The univariate analysis reveals similar results for each region. In the United 
States (U.S.), the data of 1,977 commercial loans to publicly traded companies in the 
stimulus period and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, as issued by 25 U.S.-based 
commercial banks, represent an increase of $236 billion. Such loan-level univariate 
analysis on 754 commercial loans to publicly traded companies in the stimulus period 
and 698 commercial loans in the non-stimulus period issued by nine commercial banks 
based in the European Union (EU) countries of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom (EU3) reflect an increase of $18 billion. Commercial lending was up.
The regression analysis provides different results in each region. In the U.S., the 
regressions show significant impact of the credit stimuli on the increase in commercial 
lending for five of the six credit stimuli studied. However, in the EU3 countries, the 
regression analysis reports a lack of significance in eight of the nine stimuli studied, 
which infers that the increase in commercial lending is not in response to the credit 
stimuli. Differences of approach in the provision of stimuli could explain these results.
This research contributes new findings to the financial literature. Commercial 
lending increased in both the U.S. and the EU3 countries. In addition, the U.S. shows 
significant influence of credit stimuli on the increase in lending. It appears that the U.S.- 
based commercial banks responded positively to the credit stimuli.
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1C H A P T E R  f  
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation
A stimulus is designed to incite a response of action. The desired response to 
credit stimuli by commercial banks around the world was that lending would be 
maintained or increased from prior levels. With the focus of this research on increases in 
commercial lending, this dissertation calls upon the credit channel theory of monetary 
policy effectiveness to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars 
of innovations offered by central banks and governments to stimulate the credit markets 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. To that end, I look at the response of United 
States- and European Union-based commercial banks (i.e. specifically those based in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) during the stimulus period of October 1, 
2007 through September 30, 2011 compared to the non-stimulus1 period of October 1, 
2002 through September 30, 2006 five years prior. I conduct univariate analysis, 
regressions, and event-study analysis on the impact of the various credit stimuli efforts 
on commercial lending and the real economy.
Three reasons emerge as to the importance of knowing how commercial banks 
carried out their function of commercial lending in response to the credit stimuli. First, 
this research will aid in understanding the effectiveness of monetary policy, specifically 
stimulus efforts that, according to the credit channel theory of monetary policy, should 
affect the amount of credit that banks issue to firms and households and, therefore 
benefit the real economy. Second, this knowledge will provide evidence to affirm or 
refute the claims of the financial media that the stimuli were not working and that banks
2were hoarding cash and not performing their role as financial intermediaries in 
commercial lending during the 2008 financial crisis. Third, the data lends itself to future 
research on the determinative characteristics of corporate borrowers during the crisis as 
a comparison can be performed of the companies that received commercial loans versus 
those that did not. Such information from future research could influence strategic 
planning at the corporations that seek debt financing through bank loans to drive the 
economy. It is with these reasons in mind that this research persists.
In August 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) 
became concerned about the state of the financial markets. More specifically, the Fed 
stated in an August 17, 2007 press release that:
“Financial market conditions have deteriorated, and tighter credit conditions and 
increased uncertainty have the potential to restrain economic growth going forward. In 
these circumstances, although recent data suggest that the economy has continued to 
expand at a moderate pace, the Federal Open Market Committee judges that the 
downside risks to growth have increased appreciably. The Committee is monitoring the 
situation and is prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the 
economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets". (Federal Reserve Board, 
2007a)
Later that day, the Fed determined that lending in the United States (U.S.) needed to be 
stimulated “to promote the restoration of orderly conditions in the financial markets”. At 
that time, the Board took its first stimulus action - the reduction of the spread between the 
primary credit rate (or discount rate) and the Federal funds rate to 50 basis points. 
(Federal Reserve Board, 2007b) From August 2007 through December 2012, the 
spread fluctuated from a low of 25 basis points to a high of 75 basis points.
Prior to the financial crisis, the spread between the Federal Reserve’s primary 
credit rate and the Federal funds rate was consistently set at 100 basis points. At the
3time of this writing, the spread had not reached the pre-crisis level of 100 basis points, 
but remained at a spread of 50 basis points as shown in Figure 1, Panel A of Figure 1 
depicts this rate movement based on the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s actions. Panel B 
tells the story of the rate movements based on the European Central Bank’s actions, 
which reflects slower downward movement and the near maintenance of the original 
spreads between the three key rates. Panel C presents the changes in the official bank 
rate of the Bank of England, the central bank of the United Kingdom, which operates its 
own central banking function because it has not adopted the euro as the currency of the 
nation.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In Figure 1, two clear distinctions are seen in the U.S., U.K., and EU central bank 
patterns of interest rate movements. First, the U.S. central bank (i.e. the Federal 
Reserve System) began adjustments of its key lending rates in August 2007 while the 
U.K. central bank (i.e. Bank of England) made its first rate changes in December 2007 
and the EU central bank (i.e. European Central Bank) made its first rate changes in 
October 2008 after initial rate increases to maintain price stability (i.e. inflation). Second, 
the U.S. central bank decreased the spread between interest rates and did not return to 
the pre-crisis level of 100 basis points throughout the 2008 financial crisis, while the EU 
central bank maintained the same spread between rates throughout most of the period of 
rate movement as shown on Figure 1. These differences in approach to credit stimuli 
could have an impact on the response of the commercial banks in the U.S. and in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the EU.
In addition to the interest rate adjustments, that made less expensive funds 
available for commercial banks to borrow so that they could lend to households and
4businesses, the U.S. and EU central banks engaged in stimulating credit flow via multiple 
other methods during the 2008 financial crisis. In the U.S., some of those methods 
included coordinated collaboration with the U.S. Department of Treasury (U.S. Treasury) 
and other Federal agencies. Table 1 shows a summary of the 20 credit stimuli programs 
offered to U.S.-based commercial banks.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Of the 20 credit stimuli programs included in Table 1, the Federal Reserve Board 
developed fourteen of the programs, the U.S. Treasury led four of the programs, and 
other Federal agencies implemented two of the programs. The Federal Reserve Board 
developed its 14 credit stimuli programs within the framework of three goals set to 
provide: (1) access to banks to short-term credit; (2) liquidity directly to borrowers and 
investors aimed at lessening the demands on bank deposits; and (3) support to the 
functioning of the overall credit markets. (Bernanke, 2009) This research focuses on the 
programs related to goals one and two, as goal three extends the credit stimuli to the 
mortgage market and away from commercial lending efforts. Similarly, the U.S. Treasury 
introduced the Financial Stability Plan to fulfill the purposes of: (1) restarting the credit 
flow, (2) cleaning up and strengthening the nation’s banks, and (3) aiding households 
and small businesses. (Geithner, 2009) The goals and purposes of these programs 
clearly state the intention of the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury to 
increase the amount of credit issued by banks to households and businesses.
Several stimulus programs are intentionally excluded from Table 1. The 
excluded programs are those which were not implemented to stimulate the corporate 
credit market. Two such programs are Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist. The 
goals of those efforts were to stimulate the housing market in general and consumer
5credit in particular, as well as decrease the unemployment rate (Kenny, 2013). In both 
programs, the Fed set out to lower long-term interest rates by purchasing long-term 
Treasury bonds. However, the lowering of long-term interest rates might have hindered 
the profits of the commercial banks (Hilsenrath and Di Leo, 2011), which could have the 
opposite effect of stimulating corporate credit markets. Therefore, due to the focus of 
Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist on stimulating credit to personal consumers 
and the potential for it to be a dis-incentive to commercial banks to lend to corporate 
borrowers, these stimulus programs are excluded from the scope of this study.
Table 2 provides a summary of stimulus support made available to specific U.S.- 
based financial institutions from the Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of Treasury and 
other government agencies. Several items of stimulus support are intentionally excluded 
from Table 2. The excluded programs are those that were made available to non­
commercial banks such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG), Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, GMAC, and IndyMac.
[Insert Table 2 here]
As presented in Tables 1 and 2, the Federal Reserve System and agencies of the 
U.S. Federal government offered programs ranging from interest rate reductions to 
greater deposit insurance to loans to support the overall credit market as well as specific 
financial institutions in its efforts to stimulate credit during the 2008 financial crisis. The 
amount of funds allocated to these credit stimuli programs by the Federal Reserve 
System and agencies was in the multiple trillions of dollars. The programs of the Federal 
Reserve System alone ranged from $1.5 trillion to $16 trillion based on the debates in 
the media. However, an audit2 of the Federal Reserve System’s programs by the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) (U.S. GAO, 2011) reports the amounts
6outstanding at the peak of the credit stimuli programs as $3,243 trillion. Therefore, this 
research relied on the audited amount of $3,243 trillion of credit stimuli from the Federal 
Reserve System as its estimation of that portion of the funds allocated to stimulate credit.
In addition to the $3,243 trillion available to lenders via Federal Reserve System 
programs, another approximately $300 billion was made available through the U.S. 
Department of Treasury’s TARP programs to financial institutions, and other assistance 
from other agencies, much of which cannot be quantified. For example, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) increase of the limit of deposit insurance from 
$100,000 to $250,000 per depositor, per account, per institution provided security to 
customers on the safety of their deposits, which is believed to have encouraged 
increases in deposited funds. Such a benefit has not been quantified and is outside of 
the scope of this paper. Therefore, a total of $3,543 trillion has been used as the 
estimated amount of credit stimuli invested by the United States central bank and 
government agencies to revive the flow of credit during the 2008 financial crisis.
In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) reported that its first response to 
the financial crisis occurred on August 9, 2007 when it provided unlimited liquidity 
through overnight central bank maturities at the prevailing rates. (Stark, 2009) The 
ECB’s provision of liquidity through frontloading, lengthening of average maturities, 
refinancing, using fixed-rate versus auction facilities, expanding the forms of collateral, 
and other measures continued in an operational (vs. monetary policy) framework until 
September 2008. (Stark 2009) It appears that the ECB’s objective of maintaining price 
stability (i.e. inflation) led to this application of the separation principle in relation to 
operational and monetary policy frameworks.
7By September 2008, neither the ECB nor, the countries of focus of this study, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (referred to collectively hereafter as 
“EU3”) could avoid monetary policy actions. Table 3 lists the 27 stimulus programs 
offered by the European Central Bank (Panel A), government of France (Panel B), 
government of Germany (Panel C), and Bank of England (Panel C), in support of the 
commercial banks in Europe, France, Germany, and the U.K., respectively. The 
stimulus programs of the European Central Bank apply to the eligible financial 
institutions of the euro-area in the European Union, except the United Kingdom, which 
has not adopted the euro as its country’s currency. According to the Statutes of the 
European System of Central Banks, the Banque de France and other central banks of 
euro-area countries do not institute stimulus programs independent of the ECB. The role 
of the euro-area central banks is to implement the programs instituted by the ECB and 
the governments of the respective countries. (European Central Bank, 2008) However, 
the Bank of England, the central bank of the United Kingdom, can institute its own 
monetary policy because the country has not adopted the euro as its national currency. 
Table 3 reflects the variety of credit stimulus actions undertaken in the European Union 
and the EU countries of study - France, Germany, and the U.K.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The stated credit stimulus actions were undertaken to address the current barriers to 
lending (HM Treasury, 2009) in the U.K. and to assist the financial sector in fulfilling its 
role of supplying the economy with credit (Stark, 2009) in the European Union.
An interesting feature of the stimulus programs offered in the European Union is 
that equal or more attention was paid to specific financial institutions than to general 
credit stimulus efforts that would be available to all EU-based eligible financial
institutions. In addition, the specific stimulus support was offered by the governments of 
France, Germany, and the U.K. and not by the European Central Bank. Table 4 
summarizes the 14 stimulus actions provided to specific financial institutions in the EU.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In Tables 3 and 4, the funding of each program in either euros or Great Britain 
pounds was converted to U.S. dollars. That conversion was performed based on the 
exchange rate in place on the date of the first action of the credit stimuli effort. With the 
intention to quantify the collective stimulus actions of the programs listed in Tables 3 and 
4 , 1 summed the general programs that could be quantified and the specific program 
funds provided to the commercial banks in the sample of this study. Based on the 
conversion of the efforts to U.S. dollars, this author estimates that the European Central 
Bank, Bank of England, and governments of the EU3 spent $4,286 trillion in credit 
stimulus actions.
Tables 2 through 4 tell the story of the trillions of dollars offered to U.S.- and EU- 
based commercial banks to incentivize them to engage in commercial lending. That 
level of investment in credit stimuli excludes the interest rate reductions, which cannot be 
quantified as to the benefit to the financial institutions, but requires an understanding of 
the effectiveness of this monetary policy. In Chapters 3 and 4 of this paper, I delve into 
the components of many of the programs to determine the commercial lending that 
resulted from such an investment in commercial banks. At this time, I explore both the 
factual and anecdotal view of the worldwide media on the stimulus spending and its 
purported impact on bank lending during the 2008 financial crisis.
9After searching on terms related to the topic of this paper in the LexisNexis news 
database, as well as other sources, I uncovered the hundreds of articles that were 
produced during the 2008 through 2011 period. Over 40 of those articles were found to 
represent the variety of views on stimulus spending and bank lending in the United 
States and European Union. Table 5 presents excerpts of the media coverage of credit 
stimuli efforts and the banks’ response during 2008 through 2011.
[Insert the Table 5 here]
The media reports on the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on commercial 
lending globally, in the European Union, and in the United States present conflicting 
variations of the status of stimulus efforts and responses. From a global view, the media 
reports in October 2008 stated that governments around the world were intervening in 
the financial markets to bring about restored confidence in the markets in general and 
bank lending in particular. This was evidenced by efforts in both the U.S. and 15 nations 
of the European Union to inject capital into the banking system and to guarantee bank 
debt. (“Global Bailout,” 2008). However, by November 2008, The Banker (“Recession 
looms,” 2008) reported that stock markets continued in a downward spiral even after the 
gallant rescue efforts of the global collection of governments. The downturn, 
incidentally, was happening at a time just after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 
September 2008 (Financial Turmoil Timeline, 2010), which could have contributed to the 
stock markets’ decline and the status of lending in the U.S. and EU. Later in November 
and December 2008, the U.S. and the U.K. were reported to increase their stimulus 
efforts with pledges of $7.7 trillion for the U.S. (Pittman and Ivry, 2008) and an unstated 
sum for the U.K. (Braude, 2008). By 2010, Hall (2010) reported in Trade Finance that 
U.S. banks are “turning the corner” via earnings back to pre-crisis levels and loosening
credit standards as they wait for the demand for commercial loans to arrive so that they 
can lend. Hall (2010) conceded that banks in the EU were stabilized, but had since 
tightened due to liquidity concerns. Those liquidity concerns were most evident with the 
chaos around the future of Dexia, one of the largest lenders in Belgium, which held 
nearly €100 billion in toxic sub-prime American mortgage debts, as reported in The 
Sunday Times (London). (Dey and Watts, 2010). This collection of media reports 
informed the public of the similar intervention efforts of the U.S. and EU governments, as 
well as the different results.
Some consistency ensued as the media reports on the efforts in the EU and 
United Kingdom (U.K.) began to tell the same story about lending being down, banks 
needing more capital, and government actions not happening fast enough. The 
Australian Financial Review (“Europe’s leaders,” 2008) accused Europe’s leaders of 
failing to take needed actions to bring the crisis under control with a “TARP-like” program 
that the U.S. implemented to purchase the toxic assets from the banks. In two articles in 
the Financial Times, Alloway (2011) stated that European banks were facing excessive 
funding problems and used French banks as an example based on their lead in 
borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB). This consistency in reporting the 
trouble in the EU approach and results carried over into the media’s reporting on U.K. 
efforts.
Given that the U.K. is a member of the European Union, but does not use the 
euro as its currency; instead retaining use of the Great Britain Pound (GBP), the U.K. 
operates under the guidance of its own central bank - Bank of England. As shown in 
Table 5, the media reports that focused on the U.K. proudly announced the proposed 
new stimulus in 2008 (Braude, 2008), but just as clearly informed the public of the Bank
11
of England’s (BoE) 2009 admission that the new stimulus policies were not successful as 
bank lending continued to slow (Monaghan, 2009). In 2010, the BoE went so far as to 
stop its injections into the economy due to its presumed lack of effectiveness (“Not 
Easy”, 2010). By 2011, The Sunday Times (London) reported that “bank gloom 
deepens over UK economy” (Oakeshott and Watts, 2011).
In the United States, however, controversy developed not only about the amount 
of money being spent to stimulate bank lending, but also on whether the spending was 
making a difference in the increased issuance of commercial loans. From 2008 to 2011, 
the media reported that amounts ranging from $1.5 trillion to $16 trillion had been spent 
on stimulating commercial credit. Bloomberg news went as far to say that the Federal 
Reserve’s spending was done in secret and without the full knowledge of Congress, but 
its reports could not determine if the amount was $13 billion (Ivry, et al 2011) or $1.2 
trillion (Keoun and Kuntz, 2011. The media also stated that bank lending had fallen 
faster than at any other time in history (Evans-Pritchard, 2010) and that banks were 
recovering, but that commercial lending still lagged demand (Recap, 2011). Table 5 
shares the headlines that focused on the U.S. Not only does the referenced media 
coverage contradict itself, but much of the U.S. media’s reports were called into question 
by the top official of the Federal Reserve Board.
In a letter to Congress (Bernanke, 2011), Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben 
Bernanke expressed his concerns over the discrepancies in the information presented by 
the media. He raised six areas of disagreement with the media’s coverage of the Federal 
Reserve’s stimulus programs during the 2008 financial crisis. Chairman Bernanke clarified 
each of the six areas of disagreement. First, with regard to “secret lending”, he stated that 
there were no secrets from Congress as each program was publicly announced and
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monthly reports are provided to Congress on the volume of borrowing by large banks. 
Second, on the discrepancies around the amount of the stimulus effort, Mr. Bernanke 
responded that the amount of the stimulus spending was $1.5 trillion at the peak of the 
liquidity programs and was in the form of credit outstanding. He reminded the media and 
Congress that “lending is not spending” such that many of the programs involve loans to 
banks, not grants, that will be repaid to the Federal Reserve with interest. In addition, 
there were many parts of the economy that were being addressed by the stimulus 
programs (i.e. credit market, housing market, overall financial markets, etc.) so that ail 
should be careful of overlap in the analysis. Third, Chairman Bernanke was concerned 
that the media has not actively reported on the audit of the programs by the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO)2 or the interest income generated by the loans to the banks that 
repays the American taxpayers. Fourth, given that the media accused the Federal 
Reserve of only lending to large banks, Mr. Bernanke stated in his letter to Congress that 
loans were made to 900,000 small businesses and banks, as well as others. Fifth, Mr. 
Bernanke asked the media to not depict the banks that received such stimulus support as 
“insolvent” or “in deep trouble” as the goal of the stimulus support was to keep banks from 
that condition and such comments could discourage bank participation. Sixth, and lastly, 
Chairman Bernanke admonished the media for implying that the banks received below- 
market loans from the Federal Reserve and then reaped benefits without lending to others. 
He reminded Congress that the loans included a penalty to encourage repayment, which 
removes any possibility of the loans being a subsidy to the borrowing banks. It is clear that 
Chairman Bernanke took exception to much of what the media reported about the credit 
stimuli programs of the Federal Reserve System and the banking system in general.
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Given the trillions of dollars of innovations offered by central banks and 
governments to stimulate the credit markets during the 2008 global financial crisis and 
the discrepancies in the media coverage, this research is motivated by the desire to 
uncover the truth in the media coverage and the need to determine how commercial 
banks responded to such an exorbitant investment in credit stimuli. This determination 
will address the effectiveness of monetary policy on commercial lending.
Research Questions and Design
The focus of this research is on the change in the number and value of loans 
issued over the stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 compared to 
the non-stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006. The research 
questions to be addressed test the bank lending channel component of the credit channel 
theory by exploring the perspectives of financial institutions, international finance, and 
corporate finance. To that end, I study the commercial lending that resulted from the credit 
stimuli offered to incentivize commercial banks in the United States and the two countries 
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the European Union.
The two research questions will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. In Chapter 3 , 1 answer the research question, “Did United States-based 
commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending during the 
stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non­
stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006 five years prior?” Chapter 4 
addresses the response in France, Germany, and the U.K. by answering the research 
question, “Did France-, Germany-, and United Kingdom-based commercial banks respond
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to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending during the stimulus period of October 
2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October 
2002 through September 2006 five years prior?” The answers to these research questions 
will be uncovered through a robust research design.
To test these research questions, I use loan-level data from the ThomsonOne 
database. The 2,734 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 
30, 2011 and 2,542 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through 
September 30, 2006 were selected based on dates of funding requests and ultimate 
approval in the stated periods. (NOTE: More details on the sample are provided in 
Chapter 2). Though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that actual loan origination data 
is needed for analysis of the credit activity of commercial banks, due to the lack of 
access to loan origination data (i.e. loan applications, etc.), this loan-level data provides 
an excellent source of detail for this testing and exceeds the benefits of summary 
balance sheet or aggregate data.
The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level 
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the 
stated periods - the stimulus period and the non-stimulus period - and was registered as 
a commercial bank. Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of 
the change in lending for each lender. As the database of loans includes both 
transactions by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a 
lender included in the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though 
the other lenders in the syndicate were excluded from the sample. However, only the 
amount of the transaction to which the sample’s lender contributed to the deal was 
counted in the loan activity.
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To capture the loan activity of the lenders that are U.S.-based commercial banks, 
based on the entity’s primary SIC code, I used the National Information Center (NIC) of 
the Federal Reserve to identify relationships between entities. Non-commercial banks 
were excluded from the sample as well as those with foreign parents. The original 
sample of 71 lenders became 45 commercial banks. To ensure the ability to conduct the 
event-study analysis for the economic importance of this study, I grouped the 45 
commercial banks into the 25 parent companies that serve as the trading entity for the 
subsidiary banks. The lending response of the 45 subsidiaries was included with that of 
the parent banks to capture total loan-level activity in both periods of study. For the 
lenders based in France, Germany, and the U.K., the same analysis of entity 
relationships was conducted. The result was that the original sample of 32 EU lenders 
was grouped into nine commercial banks based in either France, Germany, or the U.K. 
Overall, the commercial loans for the stimulus and non-stimulus periods, as funded by 
the commercial banks based in the U.S., France, Germany, or the U.K. were tested to 
address the two research questions.
Based on the approaches used in existing financial literature, I conduct univariate 
analysis, regressions, and event-study analysis to address each research question. With 
the change in loan quantity and loan value between the stimulus period and the non­
stimulus period, by commercial bank, being the dependent variables, the regression 
models capture the impact of the bank’s participation in credit stimuli based on either the 
dollar value of benefit or a dummy variable representation. Endogeneity concerns are 
addressed by the use of lagged independent variables and an instrumental variable 
approach. The regression models are designed not only to answer the research questions
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of whether or not the credit stimuli influenced the change in commercial lending, but also to 
provide insight into how size of bank or an increase or decrease in lending was impacted.
The event-study analysis is conducted to determine if there was an economic 
impact (i.e. benefit or cost) to the commercial banks for participating in the credit stimuli 
programs. This analysis does not address stigma issues, but is designed to guide 
awareness on the reactions of the respective stock markets to stimuli participation.
In Chapters 2 through 5, this dissertation presents further analysis of the response 
of the U.S.-based, and the France-, Germany-, and UK-based commercial banks. Chapter 
2 presents the theoretical background and univariate analysis of the data. Chapter 3 
shows the regressions and event-study analysis of the commercial lending response of 
U.S.-based commercial banks. Chapter 4 reflects analysis of the commercial lending 
response of France-, Germany-, and UK-based commercial banks. Chapter 5 makes 
conclusions.
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CWMPTEn 2 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Theoretical Foundation
Expansionary monetary policy is used by a central bank to increase the money 
supply of an economy and to stimulate spending. In large and open economies such as 
the United States and the European Union countries of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, the use of expansionary monetary policy has the effects on the goods market 
(IS) and the money market (LM) as shown in Figure 2, which represents the Mundell- 
Fleming Model (i.e. the IS/LM curve for open economies). According to Mankiw (2010) 
and classical economic theory, the increase in the money supply, as brought on by 
expansionary monetary policy, results in a shift of the LM curve to the right to reflect the 
increase in income. This increase in income leads to a fall in real interest rates, which is 
designed to spur net capital outflow by way of bank lending.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
These relationships between the supply of credit (as well as the demand for credit) 
and interest rates are reinforced in the Loanable Funds Model developed in 1965 by Knut 
Wicksell (Belke and Polleit, 2009). In the Loanable Funds Model, the supply of credit is 
defined as not only credit provided by lenders (i.e. commercial banks and others), but also 
funds acquired through the sell of bonds and new credit made available by the monetary 
policy of the Federal Reserve System (Evans, 1999). If the goal of monetary policy is to
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create credit, the Federal Reserve will do so through open market operations that increase 
the money supply (or expansionary monetary policy). Such a monetary policy approach 
should result in a decrease in interest rates, which the Loanable Funds Model states has 
the effect of increasing the supply of credit.
Further study of the IS/LM Model and the Loanable Funds Model resulted in 
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) development of the credit channel theory of monetary 
policy effectiveness. The credit channel theory, with its two components of a balance 
sheet channel and a bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), states that 
changes in a central bank’s policies not only affect the amount of credit that banks issue to 
firms and households, but also affects the real economy. Though the credit channel is 
best described as an enhancement to monetary policy transmission rather than the 
mechanism itself, it also can be seen as a set of factors that heighten the effects of 
changes in interest rates in expansionary [or contracting] economic times. Black and 
Rosen (2007) successfully evaluate the effects of the two channels of the credit channel 
separately and find that the balance sheet channel causes banks to reallocate their short­
term lending toward large firms and the bank lending channel causes banks to reduce 
the maturity of their loans in periods of tightened monetary policy.
The balance sheet channel explains that the extension of credit to creditworthy 
borrowers with collateral reduces the lender’s credit risks. (Bernanke, 2007). However, 
even with collateral, there is still a cost to the borrower for raising funds through external 
financing such as commercial loans. That cost to the borrower is broadly described as the 
“external finance premium” and reflects the net of the cost of borrowing externally and the 
opportunity cost of using internal funds. Bernanke (2007) clarifies that the theory expects 
that the external finance premium will always be positive, but will be lower for borrowers
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with strong financial positions based on net worth and liquidity ratios. His research also 
found that the external finance premium can decrease further in subsequent periods if the 
firm experiences an increase in productivity that improves its cash flows. This finding 
Bernanke (2007) named the “financial accelerator theory”.
Though Diaz and Olivero (2010) do not directly study the financial accelerator 
theory, they do develop a model based on its concepts in relation to firm-level data and the 
supply of credit by banks. In looking at the heterogeneity (or differences) in firm 
characteristics, Diaz and Olivero (2010) state that it is the high-risk small firms that seek to 
use bank lending, while the low-risk large firms can find alternative sources of financing, 
such as direct debt through bond issuance. In their modeled setting of a monetary 
contraction, they show that the cost (or “external finance premium”) to the small borrower 
limits the small firm’s financing options, but increases the options for the large firm. Using 
the Diaz and Olivero (2010) contractionary monetary policy scenario as the “opposing 
view”, this research will look for the impact of the expansionary monetary policy during the 
2008 financial crisis on firms also based on firm size with regard to bank financing.
The bank lending channel component of the credit channel theory states that the 
supply of bank loans issued by financial institutions is affected, in part, by the work of 
monetary policy. (Bernanke, 2007). Gambacorta (2002) provides a look at the bank 
lending channel from the heterogeneous multi-nation European Union perspective where 
the credit channel has been identified in Italy and the United Kingdom, but not in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Therefore, he set out to determine if an “optimal monetary policy” 
could be effected to address the various bank lending channels of the member countries. 
He found that the “optimal monetary policy” must capture financial indicators and the 
nature of the country of origin of the financial shock. With the inclusion of the United
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States in the analysis, Gambacorta and Marques-lbanez (2011) show that banks in 
Europe and the U.S. experienced changes in bank-specific characteristics prior to the 
2008 financial crisis that limited the operation of the bank lending channel during the crisis.
Overall, through the study of the credit channel theory, this author aims to 
determine the lending response of U.S.- and European Union-based commercial banks to 
credit-stimulating monetary policy. Prior research offers conflicting evidence. Morris and 
Sellon, Jr. (1995) and Ashcraft (2006) found that banks do not respond to tightened 
monetary policy as business lending occurred in spite of the restrictions. Ashcraft (2006) 
went further to state that banks respond to direct financial limitations in lending rather than 
to monetary policy. However, Hendricks and Kempa (2011) found that the credit channel 
becomes active during times of financial distress whether monetary policy is contracting or 
expanding.
Contributions to the Literature
The results of this research will contribute new knowledge to the financial 
literature in three key areas. First, the results will inform banking regulators and policy 
makers on how commercial banks in the U.S., France, and U.K. responded to the credit 
stimuli. Second, the results will provide insight to the decision makers at commercial 
banks regarding the resources offered by central banks in a troubled economy. Third, 
the results will update the financial mass media on the realities of commercial lending 
during the 2008 financial crisis. The univariate results already provide intriguing 
information.
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Data and Univariate Analysis
The data used for this research is derived from the Thomson One database of 
loan-level data of commercial loans requested worldwide on the dates of October 1,
2002 through September 30, 2006 (i.e. the “non-stimulus period”) and October 1, 2007 
through September 30, 2011 (i.e. the “stimulus period”). The non-stimulus period1, 
which is five years prior to the stimulus period, was selected as the timeframe when 
there were no central bank or government actions in place to purposely stimulate the 
credit markets. The stimulus period was determined based on the start of the Federal 
Reserve Board’s stimulus actions in August 2007 with a lag of about two months built 
into the starting period of the data with the anticipation that the benefits of the August 
2007 stimulus action would be identified first in October 2007 (or later). Further analysis 
will be conducted to confirm or deny this anticipated lag in response to the credit stimuli.
The paper first compares, through univariate analysis, the demand and supply of 
commercial loans requested from corporations and governments worldwide during the 
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 and the non-stimulus 
period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006. In Panel A of Table 6, a 
summary of loan-level data from Thomson One reflects that the total of loans requested 
during the stimulus period was 49,053 requests compared to 50,858 requests in the non­
stimulus period. In summary, the level of demand for loans from corporate and 
government requestors in the stimulus period was a decrease of only 3.5% of the loans 
requested in the non-stimulus period. The loan demand stated above includes about 
33,000 (or 65 to 67%) loan requests in both periods from non-public entities, such as 
governments, private companies, subsidiaries, and joint ventures. Those non-public
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companies were excluded from the data sample to focus this research on publicly traded 
corporations.
After excluding the non-public entities from this data sample, the demand for 
loans from public companies, as reflected by the line item titled, “Net Loans Requested 
from Researchable Public Companies” is down by 1,106 loan requests (or 6.5%) over 
the two periods. However, with regard to the value of the loan demand, financial 
institutions in both the stimulus and non-stimulus period received total loan requests 
from public companies of approximately $11.4 trillion. Overall, this level of demand for 
loans from public companies further shows that the value of loan demand remained 
strong during these two periods.
With regard to the supply of loans to publicly traded corporations, the data in 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that total approved loans to public companies increased in 
quantity and dollar value in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period. 
More specifically, only 1,747 loan requests from public companies were denied in the 
stimulus period compared to 4,896 denied requests in the non-stimulus period. It must 
be noted here that the denied loan requests are those that were not funded by a financial 
institution or syndicate by September 30, 2011 for the stimulus period or by September 
30, 2006 for the non-stimulus period. Those loan requests funded after the end of the 
period were excluded from this analysis. The net result is that 14,045 commercial loans 
were approved for publicly traded corporations in the stimulus period while only 12,002 
commercial loans were approved in the non-stimulus period, which reflects a 17% 
increase in the quantity of loans approved in the stimulus period. The dollar value of 
loans approved to publicly traded companies reflects a 35% increase during the stimulus 
period when one compares the $9.4 trillion in loan value in the stimulus period to the $7
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trillion in loan value in the non-stimulus period. Based on this univariate analysis, it is 
clear that, worldwide, greater commercial loan quantity and value were supplied during 
the stimulus period than during the non-stimulus period.
This research provides further analysis of commercial loans funded by 
commercial banks based in the United States and the two countries of the European 
Union. In Panel B of Table 6, the “Total Loans Funded by All Lenders” is netted to reflect 
the net loans funded by the commercial banks of the sample that are based in the United 
States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in aggregate. Those three countries 
of the European Union were chosen for focused study because the financial institutions 
in each country represent the top lenders in the stimulus and non-stimulus periods.
With a total of 2,731 loans to be studied in the stimulus period and 2,542 loans in the 
non-stimulus period, the data once again shows that more commercial lending occurred 
in the stimulus period than in the non-stimulus period. However, it must be stated that 
the percentage of loans funded given the volume of requests during each period is down 
at 19.4% (i.e. 2,731/14,045) in the stimulus period compared to 21.2% (i.e.
2,542/12,002) in the non-stimulus period. The value of the commercial loans to be 
studied is, however, an increase in the stimulus period over the non-stimulus period.
The line items of Panel C of Table 6 show that both the U.S.- based and EU- 
based commercial banks made more loans in the stimulus period versus the non­
stimulus period. However, the EU-based commercial banks in France, Germany, and 
the U.K. distributed fewer dollars ($ mil) in the stimulus period than in the non-stimulus 
period. This univariate analysis provides preliminary data that demand for commercial 
loans was at comparable levels during the stimulus period and that the supply of credit 
was up in both regions.
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[Insert Table 6 here]
Table 7 provides summary statistics of the final data sample based on the 
response of commercial banks based in the U.S. and the EU countries of France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. The first two columns of data reflect the comparison 
of the stimulus period activity for the U.S. versus the three countries of the European 
Union. There, it is seen that U.S.-based commercial banks issued greater than 3.5 times 
more loan value than the EU3-based commercial banks. In addition, the minimum loan 
value for U.S.-based commercial loans was twice that of the EU3 commercial loans in 
the stimulus period, while the U.S.-based maximum loan values were 1.79 times more 
than the size of those from the EU countries. Overall, the average size of the 
commercial loans issued in the U.S. were 36% greater in the stimulus period, while 
France, Germany, and the UK collectively issued commercial loans that were about the 
same average size over the two periods of study. However, the average time to final 
maturity for all countries decreased from the non-stimulus period to the stimulus period.
[Insert Table 7 here]
These summary statistics are shown graphically on an annual basis for U.S.- 
based commercial banks and EU3-based commercial banks in Figures 3 and 4, 
respectively. In Panel A of each figure, the graph reflects the number of commercial 
loans issued by year. Notice that Panel A of Figure 3 depicts that U.S.-based 
commercial banks increased the number of commercial loans issued in period three, or 
the October 2009 through September 2010 stimulus period, over the loans issued in the 
non-stimulus period. On the other hand, Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the EU3-based 
commercial banks issued fewer loans in periods two and four of the stimulus period than 
those issued in the non-stimulus period. With regard to total loan value and average
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loan size, by year, Panels B and C of each figure, respectively tell opposing stories for 
U.S. versus the three countries of the EU. In Figure 3, the U.S.-based commercial banks 
report commercial loan values and average loan sizes in the stimulus period greater than 
those in the non-stimulus period starting in period 2, or the annual period of October 
2008 through September 2009. However, the EU3-based commercial banks fell behind 
in period 3 of the stimulus period when compared to the non-stimulus period as shown in 
Panels B and C of Figure 4. The story here preliminarily appears to be that commercial 
banks in the U.S. responded with increases in commercial lending in period 2 of the 
stimulus period, while the EU3-based commercial banks responded with decreases in 
commercial lending in period 3 of the stimulus period. The regressions and event-study 
analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will further evaluate these univariate results.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
[Insert Figure 4 here]
I now turn to a look at the publicly traded corporations that requested loans 
during the stimulus and non-stimulus periods. Figure 5 highlights the percentages of all 
publicly traded corporations whose requests for funding were approved versus denied.
In Panel A, it is seen that the stimulus period resulted in 83% of requested commercial 
loans approved versus 17% denied. In Panel B, the presentation shows that the non­
stimulus period resulted in only 61% of requested commercial loans being approved 
while 39% were denied. This data provides another depiction of an increase in 
commercial loan issuance in the stimulus period (i.e. 83% approved) versus the non­
stimulus period (i.e. 61% approved).
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[Insert Figure 5 here]
To understand more about the denied requesting corporations and the borrowers, 
I examined the three characteristics of home country, industry, and proposed use of 
proceeds for each loan request. For ease of analysis, this examination compares the 
denied requestors to those corporations that became borrowers of U.S.-based lenders. 
First, Figure 6 shows the top five home countries of the denied requestors and the 
borrowers in the stimulus period (Panel A) and the non-stimulus period (Panel B). Of the 
denied requestors, 100% of the requesting corporations in both periods are based in 
Australia. It must also be noted that 97% of the requesting corporations in the stimulus 
period and 99% of the requesting corporations in the non-stimulus period are based in 
the United Kingdom. Of the borrowers, 71% of the requesting corporations in the 
stimulus period and 42% of the requesting corporations in the non-stimulus periods are 
based in the United States. In summary, a greater percentage of U.S. corporations were 
approved for commercial loans by U.S.-based commercial banks in the stimulus period 
(i.e. 71.32%) than in the non-stimulus period (i.e. 41.89%).
[Insert Figure 6 here]
The second characteristic of the requesting corporations being examined is the 
primary industries of operation. After grouping the primary SIC codes of each publicly 
traded requesting corporation into the Fama-French 12-industry groupings, it became 
clear which industries received more approval than denial in the stimulus versus the non­
stimulus period. In Panel A of Figure 7, it shows that requesting corporations in the 
industries of business equipment (6), shops (or retail) (9), and healthcare (10) received 
more loan approvals than denials in the stimulus period. In Panel B of Figure 7, none of 
the industries received more loan approvals than denials in the non-stimulus period.
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However, Panel B does show that, during the non-stimulus period, commercial loans 
were approved for corporations in the consumer durables (2), business equipment (6), 
and shops (or retail) (9) industries more than any others. This view of the data shows 
that publicly traded corporations in the business equipment (6) and shops (or retail) (9) 
industries have been approved for commercial loans in both periods. Per Panel C of 
Figure 7, the data highlights three industries that were consistently approved for 
commercial loans less than the other industries. Those three industries with the lowest 
net approval rates over the two periods are utilities (8), money (which includes banks 
and other financial institutions) (11) and other (12). With this result, the univariate 
analysis informs that the U.S-based commercial banks being evaluated not only did not 
lend primarily to other financial institutions in the money industry, but approved loans 
during the stimulus period to publicly traded corporations in the industries of business 
equipment (6), shops (or retail) (9), and healthcare (10).
[Insert Figure 7 here]
The third characteristic being examined is the proposed use of the proceeds 
being requested for the commercial loan. Based on the loans requested in the stimulus 
period of October 2007 through September 2011, 42 proposed uses of proceeds were 
represented. Panel A of Figure 8 shows the 14 uses of proceeds that experienced 
positive net loan approval rates. Loans requesting to use the proceeds for the 
redemption of A-class shares and secondary market offerings received the highest 
percentage of loan approval in the stimulus period. Panel B of Figure 8 shows the 16 
uses of proceeds that resulted in negative net loan approval rates. The least approved 
(i.e. the largest negative net approval rate) proposed uses of proceeds were 
construction, refinancing, and ship financing. Table 8 shows the 12 other proposed uses
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of proceeds that were fully denied in the stimulus period though these same proposed 
uses of proceeds received some loan approval in the non-stimulus period. This 
univariate analysis implies that U.S.-based commercial banks approved debt issuance to 
fund equity market activity, but not more operational uses of proceeds, during the 
stimulus period.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
[Insert Table 8 here]
Based on the Thomson One loan-level data being used in this research, the 
univariate analysis provides evidence on how commercial banks responded during the 
stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period. From the data, it is revealed that 
the U.S.-based commercial banks in the sample responded positively, presumably to the 
credit stimuli, through increased number and value of commercial loans issued during 
the stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non­
stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006 five years prior. With regard to 
the France-, and UK-based commercial banks, it appears that there was a negative 
response, presumably to the credit stimuli, as evidenced by the decreased number and 
value of commercial loans issued during the stimulus period when compared to the non­
stimulus period five years prior. Chapters 3 and 4 reflect regression and event-study 
analysis for a more robust examination of the data.
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CWAPTER 3
THE RESPONSE OF U.S.-BASED COMMERCIAL BANKS
TO CREDIT STIMULI
Literature Review
To determine if the credit stimuli positively or negatively influenced commercial 
lending, it is important to understand the key factors needed for commercial banks to 
lend and whether or not the credit stimuli of the central banks and government agencies 
addressed those factors. Madura (2012) states that one key factor for banks to make 
loans and other investments is the availability of funds. He identifies such sources of 
funds as deposits, borrowed funds, bond issues, and bank capital. These sources and 
other factors are considered in relation to the influence of credit stimuli on commercial 
lending.
More specifically, researchers have found impacts on lending from several 
factors. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Ghosh (2008) found that lending was down 
when the demand for loans was down. Therefore, loan demand is a key factor of loan 
supply (or lending). In looking at the data for this study, Table 6 provides evidence that 
the demand for loans remained strong at $11.4 trillion in both the stimulus period of 
October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 and the non-stimulus period of October 1, 
2002 through September 30, 2006. Another factor of lending is the level of lending 
standards (Lown and Morgan, 2002) imposed by banks on potential borrowers. Figure 9 
reflects the responses of loan officers of the 51 domestic banks and 22 U.S. branches 
and agencies of foreign banks who completed the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
on Bank Lending Practices as reported by the Federal Reserve System. The figure
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shows that lending standards tightened more during the stimulus period when compared 
to the non-stimulus period. According to Lown and Morgan (2002, 2006), tightened 
lending standards lead to reduced commercial loan growth. Presuming that the opposite 
is also true (i.e. reduced lending standards lead to increased commercial loan growth), it 
must be noted that net tightening reduced during the latter half of the stimulus period, as 
also shown in Figure 9.
[Insert Figure 9 here]
Other researchers examined the profitability of lending (Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; 
Lown and Morgan, 2002; Park, 2006); and risk aversion (Berger and Udell, 1994; 
Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995) which led to conclusions that 
banks reduced or withheld from lending when the loans were not profitable or when the 
risks were too high to justify the return. Though the stated results on profitability and risk 
aversion were widely supported, the results were not as clear on the impact of capital 
and deposits, as sources of funds3, on bank lending during a financial crisis.
Therefore, three further streams of literature were followed to explore these 
ambiguous factors. First, I reviewed the literature on the impact of risk-based capital 
requirements on lending. Second, I looked at what other researchers uncovered about 
the availability of funds on deposit and the implications of deposit insurance on lending. . 
Third, I examined the research on the effects of monetary policy on bank lending. This 
literature review summarizes the findings of relevant research in these literature streams.
With regard to the literature on the sources of funds for commercial lending in the 
United States, several papers add insight on capital and deposits available for lending. 
After the implementation of risk-based capital requirements of Basel I4 in the early
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1990s, which required banks to hold capital in proportion to their perceived credit risks, 
much research was conducted on whether this requirement for banks to put more capital 
aside would decrease, have no impact, or increase commercial lending. The existing 
literature reached conflicting results in making the determination regarding the impact of 
Basel I. VanHoose (2007) states it best in his survey paper on the topic and leads to an 
inconclusive result on the impact. However, based on the papers studied by this author, 
56% report findings that increased risk-based capital requirements led to decreases in 
commercial lending (Peek and Rosengren, 1996; Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; Thakor,
1996; Stanton, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Bernauerand Koubi, 2002; Honda, 
2004; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; and Gambacorta and Marquez-lbanez, 2011). The 
percentage of papers that found no change in lending based on increased risk-based 
capital requirements goes down to 25% and includes papers by Bernanke and Lown 
(1991), Berger and Udell (1994), Brinkman and Horvitz (1995), Peek and Rosengren 
(1995), Park (2006), and Ghosh (2008). Finally, 19% of the research on capital 
requirements showed that, in cases of stronger banks with excess capital, 
implementation of Basel I led to increases in lending (Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995; 
Bernauer and Koubi, 2002; and Cole, 2012). Though VanHoose’s (2007) summarization 
shows that the literature is inconclusive on the impact of risk-based capital requirements, 
more than half (i.e. 56%) of the existing literature reviewed by this author found that 
increased risk-based capital requirements lead to decreased lending.
The research on the importance of deposits as a source of funding for bank 
lending also faces mixed results. Researchers who examined the impact of bank 
deposits reached different conclusions. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) stated that the 
original near-zero interest costs on deposits gave banks an advantage when they could
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lend those deposited funds at profitable rates. The reversal of that advantage occurred 
in the 1980s when other financial institutions began offering earnings on deposits.
Banks were then forced to seek (and gain) the elimination of Regulation Q that put a 
ceiling on the interest that it could pay on deposits. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) added 
that such developments reduced the importance of deposits as a funding source for 
banks to lend. However, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Mora (2010) found 
significance in a bank’s deposit holdings. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) examined the 
number of loan transactions from 2000 to 2006 and found that new loans to large 
borrowers fell by 47% during the peak of the 2008 crisis (4th quarter), relative to the prior 
quarter, and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (2nd quarter of 2007) in line 
with changes in deposits. They state that banks’ loans receivables increased due to 
draws on credit lines, rather than new loan issuances, and loans payable decreased due 
to a run by short-term bank creditors. In general, they associated the decrease in 
lending during the 2008 financial crisis with the decrease in deposits. Mora (2010) 
presented further evidence, both from aggregate and individual bank data, that funds did 
not flow into bank deposits as robustly as in past times of stress and, therefore, bank 
lending did not increase as much. Given the conflicting views of these researchers on 
the importance of deposits to lending, I look at the role of deposit insurance to resolve 
these differences.
Deposit insurance was developed to provide a safety net to depositors and 
bankers alike. Though it was in place in various forms prior to the establishment of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the deposit insurance provisions of the 
Banking Act of 1933 officially formed the FDIC and deposit insurance terms. (FDIC, 
1998). While proponents of deposit insurance believed that it would aid in maintaining
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financial stability in the banking sector, opponents at the time saw the potential for 
additional risk-taking by bankers covered by insurance protection. In a 2000 paper, 
Diamond and Rajan studied the impact of deposit insurance on lending and found that 
bank lending is reduced when not all of the deposits are insured, but that lending 
increases when all deposits are insured as the banks are “safe” to invest in loans due to 
the insurance subsidy. On the other hand, in a policy research working paper for The 
World Bank, Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2012wp) looked at over 4,000 banks in 
96 countries in periods of crisis and non-crisis to determine the impact of deposit 
insurance on bank risk-taking. They found that, during the period of non-crisis, the 
safety net provided by deposit insurance increased bank risk-taking and reduced overall 
financial stability. However, during the period of crisis, deposit insurance did not lead to 
increased bank risk, as such was lower, and greater systemic stability ensued. The net 
effect was that the non-crisis period’s results were more dominant and, overall, deposit 
insurance led to increased bank risk and reduced stability. As the focus of this paper is 
on periods of financial crisis, the results from the crisis-period testing apply to this work 
and, during crisis periods, the researcher found that deposit insurance led to reduced 
bank risk taking.
With regard to periods of financial crisis, the existing financial literature 
addresses the effects of monetary policy on bank lending both in general and in relation 
to specific credit stimuli programs. Thakor (1996) developed a model that explained 
that the Fed’s effort to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply during the 
1990-1991 “credit crunch” was unsuccessful because the effect of monetary policy 
depends on its effects on the term structure of interest rates. According to the model, if 
monetary policy increases the money supply, but decreases short-term interest rates
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more than long-term rates, then lending decreases. Similarly, Thakor (1996) found that if 
monetary policy increases the money supply, but decreases long-term rates more than 
short-term rates, then lending remains flat or increases. Diamond and Rajan (2000) 
looked at the level of the increase in cash (i.e. capital) infused by a central bank into the 
banking sector. They found that if the amount of cash is only large enough to prevent 
bank runs, for example, then loans could be recalled and lending standards tightened, 
which, according to other researchers, would lead to reductions in lending. On the other 
hand, if the amount of cash is considered “substantially large”, they found that banks can 
extend new loans. In studying over 900,000 transactions during the period of 1976 
through 1993, Kashyap and Stein (2000) found that monetary policy’s effect on lending is 
stronger for banks with less liquid balance sheets, which is typically the smaller banks. 
They also found that the largest banks make heavier use of the Federal funds market 
whereas the smaller banks made very little to no use of Federal funds to aid liquidity. 
Similarly, Keister and McAndrews (2009) studied the high levels of bank excess reserves 
and found that such excess is simply a by-product of the Federal Reserve’s new lending 
facilities and asset purchase programs. However, they qualified their findings by stating 
that the reality of bank’s holding excess reserves provides no information about the 
initiatives’ effects on bank lending or on the economy. Therefore, the liquidity of the 
balance sheet could be a determinant of commercial lending along with interest rates 
(Thakor, 1996) and capital infusions (Diamond and Rajan, 2000).
In addition to the impact of the items stated above, researchers examined the 
direct effect of specific credit stimulus programs on bank lending. Berrospide and Edge 
(2010) concluded that the extensive capital injections under the Capital Purchase 
Program of TARP did not lead to growth in lending because banks base loan decisions
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on either demand or risk or both rather than levels of capital. Stolz and Wedow (2010) 
conducted a comparison of the measures put in place by the central banks of the 
European Union, United Kingdom and the United States and the effectiveness of those 
measures. With regard to the actions taken by the U.S. Federal Reserve System to 
stimulate credit, they found that: (1) dollar funded pressures were reduced as a result of 
the swap lines arranged by the Fed with several other nations; (2) after the issuance of 
facilities to support the primary dealers, spreads in the interbank market narrowed, but 
were still above the pre-crisis levels; and (3) the evidence is inconclusive on the ability of 
the Term Auction Facilities (TAF) to lower spreads. Stolz and Wedow (2010) also point 
out that the Fed received a profitable return of interest income on many of its measures, 
but do not provide any view as to whether the measures stimulated overall credit, which 
was the initial goal. Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2012wp) studied the impact 
of the availability of discount window and term auction facilities in relation to bank 
lending and found no evidence that the banks that participated in those programs 
increased lending when compared to the banks that did not participate. Black and 
Hazelwood (2012) studied the effect of TARP on bank risk-taking and find that, relative 
to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks, but 
decreased at small TARP banks. However, at large TARP banks, there was an increase 
in risk-taking without an increase in lending; possibly due to the conflicting goals of the 
TARP program for bank capitalization and bank lending. Cole (2012), in looking at the 
particular impact of stimulus efforts on lending to small businesses, concluded that TARP 
participants decreased lending to businesses of all sizes more so than did non-TARP 
participants. Overall, the existing financial literature concludes that bank lending was 
down even after the many credit stimulus efforts during the 2008 financial crisis.
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In other words, these researchers state that the credit stimulus did not stimulate 
bank lending due to the stimulus being too small as well as the conflicting goals of 
stimulus programs such as TARP and interest on excess reserves, among other reasons 
as stated above. However, most of the referenced papers used data on more than one 
loan type and each of the papers covered loan activity in periods that ended before or 
during 2009, which was near the height of the crisis. This paper analyzes data on 
commercial loans only to remove the possible effect of netting commercial loan activity 
with that of the other loan types and, not only extends the period to September 2011 to 
show the potential lag in the response to the credit stimuli and, but also compares the 
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 to a non-stimulus period 
of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 (i.e. five years prior to the stimulus 
period) as a form of “control period”. In addition, this paper looks at not only the change 
in the number of loan transactions, as Ivashina and Sharfstein (2010) did, but also 
examines the change in dollar value of loan activity based on loan-level data versus 
aggregate or even bank-level data. These improvements in research methodology are 
discussed later in this paper.
Researchers not only provided insight on the impact of government and central 
bank policies, but also made recommendations on the most effective focus of credit stimuli 
policies. In their examination of policies that affect the banking industry in general and the 
role of banks in determining the money supply, Diamond and Dybvig (1986), conclude that 
there are certain key provisions that should be included in policies to ensure that banks 
perform the valuable services that they are designed to conduct. Those key provisions 
include: (1) preserving the ability for banks to create liquidity (i.e. through lending); (2) 
retaining the safeguards of deposit insurance; and (3) counteracting the safeguards, such
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as deposit insurance, so that banks do not take on too much risk. Zeltkevic (2009) 
suggested that policy makers not aim to merely pressure banks into expanding credit 
offerings, but support the industry by unclogging capital markets, providing funds to be 
used for lending, and/or engaging in fiscal stimulus that would create a demand for 
lending. In addition, Mora (2010) determined that, for banks to be equipped to serve as 
liquidity providers in a financial crisis, policy makers would need to take three key 
actions. First, policy makers must provide direct interventions into the markets to 
increase the supply of credit in general, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) that allowed businesses to issue short-term paper to fund investments. Second, 
policy makers need to enhance the supervision and regulation of banks considered “too 
big to fail”. Third, policy makers should limit the amount of risk that banks could take in 
through loans and other investments. With a focus on lending to small businesses, Cole 
(2012) presented policy makers with new insights for policies that will increase business 
lending by setting higher capital requirements, reducing the size of the largest banks, 
and encouraging the formation of new banks. These policy recommendations from 
Diamond and Dybvig (1986), Zeltkevic (2009), Mora (2010), and Cole (2012) cover a 
range of areas of which some were addressed to stimulate credit in the United States.
Table 9 provides a “scorecard” of the comparison of the above research-based 
recommendations to stimulate credit and the actions taken by the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System and government agencies for the same purpose. Upon giving one point for full 
adherence to each of the 12 recommendations, the U.S. central bank and agencies earned 
8.50 points out of 12 possible points, which equates to a 70.83% score. However, the 
credit stimuli implemented by the U.S. included more efforts than those suggested by 
researchers.
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[Insert Table 9 here]
Fed Chairman Bernanke (2009) described the programs of the Federal Reserve 
System in terms of three sets of tools. The first tool provided access for banks to short­
term credit. The second tool provided liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key 
markets to take the pressure off the banks. The third tool involved the purchase of 
longer-term securities to reduce long-term rates in support of the housing market. 
Similarly, Secretary Geithner (2009) outlined a new Financial Stability Plan that was 
designed to (1) revive credit flow, (2) strengthen banks, and (3) make available much- 
needed support to homeowners and small businesses. Other agencies of the U.S.
Federal government developed credit stimuli efforts following this same reasoning.
Based on the above review of the existing financial literature and the actions of the 
U.S. central bank and government agencies, this paper aims to address the influence 
that the $3,543 trillion of U.S. stimulus funds had on commercial lending. More 
specifically, I answer the research question of, “Did U.S.-based commercial banks 
respond to credit stimuli with increased lending during the stimulus period of October 1, 
2007 through September 30, 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October 
1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 five years prior”?
Given that the univariate analysis in Chapter 2 shows that lending increased for 
the sample of data in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period and the 
existing literature did not report on comparative periods outside of the stimulus period, I 
hypothesize that the change in commercial lending in the stimulus period will be greater 
than commercial lending in the non-stimulus period. The null hypothesis is that lending in 
the stimulus period will be less than or equal to commercial lending in the non-stimulus 
period based on the credit stimuli offered by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and
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government agencies. If the results show a rejection of the null hypothesis, then lending 
increased in the stimulus period and it will appear that commercial banks responded 
positively to the credit stimuli. The results will be uncovered through the data and 
research methodology.
Data and Methodology
To test this hypothesis, I used loan-level data from the ThomsonOne database. 
The 1,977 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 
and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 
2006 were selected based on dates of funding requests and ultimate approval in the 
stated periods. This use of loan-level data and the comparison of time periods five years 
apart represent a significant break from most of the existing literature, which generally 
either uses aggregate data within the financial crisis time period or includes only a short 
interval prior to the crisis. In addition, though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that 
actual loan origination data is needed for analysis of the credit activity of commercial 
banks, one can agree that this loan-level data provides more detail than summary 
balance sheet or aggregate data. In addition, this author believes that the non-stimulus 
period represents a valid control period to which to compare the responses of the 
lenders to the central bank’s actions during the stimulus period.
The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level 
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the 
stated periods. Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of the 
change in lending for each lender. As the database of loans includes both transactions
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by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a lender included in 
the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though the other lenders in 
the syndicate were excluded from the sample. However, only the amount of the 
transaction to which the U.S.-based lender contributed was counted in the loan activity. 
Initially, the sample of lenders included both commercial and non-bank financial 
institutions.
To capture the lending activity of the lenders that are U.S.-based commercial 
banks, based on the entity’s primary SIC code, I used the National Information Center 
(NIC) of the Federal Reserve to identify relationships between entities. Non-commercial 
banks were excluded from the sample as well as those with foreign parents. The original 
sample of 71 lenders became 45 commercial banks. To ensure the ability to conduct the 
event-study analysis for the economic importance of this study, I grouped the 45 
commercial banks into the 25 parent companies that serve as the trading entity for the 
subsidiary banks. The lending response of the 20 subsidiaries was included with that of 
the 25 respective parent banks in both periods of study, regardless of when the 
relationship began, to capture comparative total loan-level activity. Table 10 reflects the 
summary statistics of the key characteristics of the U.S.-based commercial banks in the 
resulting sample.
[Insert Table 10 here]
As shown on Table 10, the 25 U.S.-based commercial banks were separated into 
size groupings for this analysis. The size groupings were based on the average of the 
annual total assets for the years of the stimulus and non-stimulus period, respectively. 
The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks in each size category for each
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period to allow for the calculation of the change in lending activity for each bank. The 
statistics on participation in stimulus programs relate to the maximum number of stimulus 
programs in which the banks in the size grouping participated. Five of the 11 stimulus 
programs for which the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department made detailed 
participation data available are represented in Table 10. The final five programs 
included in the testing reflect the removal of six of the 11 programs from the analysis due 
to no participation by the sample of banks (i.e. TALF) or high correlation with either the 
dependent variable or the other independent variables. The change in the number and 
value of loans provides the data for the dependent variable in the regression analysis.
Both regression and event-study analyses were conducted to address the 
research question of this chapter. To that end, both forms of analysis were conducted on 
six of the eleven programs for which the Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury Department 
released participation details. The programs of analysis include: (1) Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF); (2) Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF); (3) Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the largest bank 
program under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); (4) Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP) (also known as “stress tests"); and (5) the Term Auction 
Facility (TAF). Table 1 provides a description of each program.
Regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between the change 
in the number of loan transactions and value of the loans, as the dependent variables, 
and the various independent variables. The dependent variable was calculated to 
capture the change in the number and value of the loans, as follows:
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ChginNumjt =  Number o f  loansstimulus Period -  Number o f loansNon_stimulus Period
or (1)
ChginValjt =  Value o f loans ($ m il)stimuius Period —
Value o f loans ($ T^il) Non-stimulus Period
In line with the determination by Gambacorta and Marques-lbanez (2011) that quarterly 
data is needed to determine the short-term impact of monetary policy on lending, each 
calculation was performed on a quarterly basis with the corresponding quarter five years 
prior to the stimulus period date. For example, the number or value of loans signed 
during the quarter of October 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 in the stimulus period 
were offset by the number or value of loans signed during the quarter of October 1, 2002 
through December 31, 2002 in the non-stimulus period. This pattern continued through 
the 16 quarters that ended July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011, which was offset 
by the loan activity during the quarter of July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006.
The independent variables were selected to maintain the focus on addressing the 
research question of, “Was commercial lending in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 
through September 30, 2011 the same as or greater than commercial lending in the non­
stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 given $3,543 trillion in 
total stimuli”?. To that end, the independent variables used in this study reflect the 
participation of the sample of banks in the five programs stated above along with the 
variable of the change in total deposits to capture the effect of the stimulus action of 
increasing the deposit insurance limit. The regression model used is as follows:
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ChginNum.jt or ChginValjt =  
ct; +  f t  AMLFjt +  f t  CPFFjt +  f t  CPPjt +  /34 SCAPj t +  f t  TAFJt 
4- (36 C hginDep(orTotalDep)jt +  
f t  Bank Fixed E ffects  +  f t  Time Fixed E ffec ts  +  e;C, (2)
where ChginNum is the change in the number of loans for the j,h bank during quarter t 
and ChginVal is the change in the value of the loans for the jth bank during quarter t; 3 is 
a parameter that measures the sensitivity of each independent variable to the dependent 
variable. AMLFjt, CPFFjt, CPP program of TARPjt, and TAFjt capture the dollar value of 
the bank’s, j, participation in the stated program during the quarter, t. SCAPjt 
participation is reflected as a dummy variable during the quarter of the release of the 
results as it represents the stress tests that were performed on the 19 largest banks, of 
which 11 are in this sample of banks. ChginDepjt or TotalDepjt reflect the level of 
deposits of the bank, j, during the quarter, t, as either the change or the total deposits in 
the regression. ejt is a random variable that, by construction, must have an expected 
value of zero, and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables.
This methodology also includes attention to the impact of the differences between 
the commercial banks and quarterly periods of the sample, as well as the endogenous 
nature of the bank lending decision. To address the differences between the commercial 
banks, bank fixed effects were included in the regression model. To address the 
differences between the quarterly periods, time fixed effects were included in the model. 
In following the approach of Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz, (2012wp), 
endogeneity in the bank lending decision was addressed by lagging the data in each 
independent variable by one quarter.
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In addition, regression analysis was conducted based on the bank’s size, as 
measured by average total assets as described previously. For that analysis, the sample 
was divided into subsets that reflect the banks of each size category. Equation (2) was 
then regressed using the change in the number of loans as the dependent variable to 
account for the differences in dollar values of funding available based on size. Overall, the 
analysis was done to determine the impact of the stimuli on lending based on size of bank.
Event-study analysis was conducted to assess the economic impact on the U.S. 
commercial banks around the dates of their participation in and the release of information 
on the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department’s credit stimuli. The goal of this 
analysis was to determine whether the sample of U.S. commercial banks benefited via the 
equity markets from the nearly $3.5 to $9 trillion (Isidore, 2010) in credit stimulus that was 
made available to eligible institutions. In other words, did the market react positively or 
negatively to the participation of banks in the credit stimuli?
Given that information is the driver of market reaction, it must be noted that each of 
the 25 U.S. commercial banks in the sample released approximately 3,000 pieces of 
information over the period of this study. Such “contagion effects” can lead to biased event 
study results in which no specific event can be credited with impacting the market’s 
reaction on any given day. However, with this limitation in mind, this event study analyzes 
the market’s reaction to the participation, or lack thereof, of the sample banks in the six 
credit stimuli programs for which the Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury Department 
released participation details, just as the regression analysis testing, and as shown in 
Table 1. In addition, event-study analysis was conducted on those U.S. commercial banks 
in the sample that received specific financial support from the Federal Reserve, U.S.
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Treasury, or other government source as a form of credit stimuli. The details of such 
support are described in Table 2.
This event study analysis was conducted using an estimation period of 90 days 
before the event window of 30 days before and after the event and two models for 
comparison of the market’s reaction. The two models are the Market Model and the 
Market-adjusted Return Model5. The Market Model is a one-factor statistical model that 
assumes that security returns can be explained by the market portfolio’s returns, as 
follows:
where Rjt is the rate of return of the common stock of the jth firm on day t; ft is a 
parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjtto the market index. Rmt is the rate of 
return of a market index (i.e. S&P 500 index) on day t; ejt is a random variable that, by 
construction, must have an expected value of zero, and is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with Rmt, uncorrelated with Rk, for k *  j, not autocorrelated, and homoskedastic. The 
Market Model defines the abnormal return (or prediction error) for the common stock of 
the jth firm on day t as:
where the coefficients cij and /?j are ordinary least squares estimates of a; and ft. The 
average abnormal return (or average prediction error) AARtis the sample mean:
R jt  ~  a j  4" fij Rmt +  £jt, (3)
Aj t  — R jt  4"  P j  Rmt)< (4)
(5)
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where t is defined in trading days relative to the event date. With T , representing 30 
trading days before the event and T2 representing 30 days after the event, the 
cumulative average abnormal return is:
CAART1T2 =  — 'Et=TiAjt. (6)
Though the Market Model is most commonly used (MacKinlay, 1997), it can 
produce biased results when the events for the firms in the sample are clustered around 
similar calendar dates (Seiler, 2004), as are the events of this study. Therefore, results 
were also obtained using the Market-Adjusted Return Model for comparative purposes.
The Market-adjusted Return Model is a restricted market model that potentially 
reduces some of the bias due to event clustering because it does not require an 
estimation period. The restrictions used in this model are that a; is set constant at zero 
and 3j is set constant at one given that the estimation period is not used to calculate 
normal model parameters (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). Therefore, market- 
adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the observed return on the market index 
(i.e. S & P 500 Index) for day t, Rmt, from the rate of return of the common stock of the jth
firm on day t:
Ajt =  Rjt ~  Rmt (7)
The definitions of the average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal 
return are the same as those presented above in the Market Model discussion. In 
addition, both the Market Model and the Market-adjusted Return Model were used to 
calculate the single-date and twin-date mean cumulative abnormal returns.
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The period between the date that the bank participated in one of the six credit 
stimuli programs and the date that the Federal Reserve released information on that 
participation to the public (i.e. December 1, 2010) is known as “twin dates” in event study 
analysis. Twin dates exist for four of the six programs under study, which means that the 
information was not released to the public on the dates of the actual transactions. The 
date of December 1, 2010 is the release date for the AMLF, CPFF, and TAF programs. 
The CPP program of TARP and the SCAP programs released information to the public 
on the date of the actual transactions and, therefore, this analysis was only conducted on 
the single dates for those two programs. In the twin date analysis, the cumulative 
abnormal return was calculated as:
CART1j,T2j =  2^=7! ;• Ajt, (8)
where T^ , T2] are the two event dates specific to firm j and Lj is the length of the event 
period in trading days. The cumulative abnormal return for the single and twin date 
analysis was used to determine the overall market response to the bank’s participation in 
the stated programs.
Analysis of the Data
The results of the regression and event-study analyses are presented in Tables 
11 through 16. Tables 11 through 14 capture the results of the regression analysis.
Table 11 shows the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable of the 
number of loan transactions. Table 12 reflects the value of the loans ($ mil) as the 
dependent variable. Tables 13 and 14 again use the number of loan transactions as the 
dependent variable, but Table 13 splits the sample by size of bank while Table 14 splits
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the sample by the banks that had a decrease or an increase in lending. The data tells 
the story of the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending and the market’s 
reaction.
Based on the dependent variable of the number of loan transactions, the four 
models shown in Table 11 capture the significance of the CPFF, CPP program of TARP, 
SCAP, and TAF programs, as well as total deposits. In each model, even though model
(1) does not include fixed effects, the four programs show a significant though small impact 
on the number of commercial loans issued. SCAP and TAF show negative impact, which 
means that the bank’s participation in those programs results in a reduction in the number 
of loans issued. It is also clear from Table 11 that the Change in Deposits variable in 
model (3) had an insignificant impact on commercial lending, while the Total Deposits 
variable in model (4) is significant.
[Insert Table 11 here]
Table 12 reflects the use of the change in the value of the loans ($ mil) as the 
dependent variable. In this case, only two programs, SCAP and TAF, are consistently 
significant and with negative impact on the value of the loans issued. Again, the Change 
in Deposits variable in model (3) is not significant, while the Total Deposits variable in 
model (4) is significant even though a very small impact.
[Insert Table 12 here]
When the sample is delineated by the size of the bank, using the change in the 
number of loan transactions as the dependent variable, three clear results are seen in 
Table 13. First, the small banks did not benefit from the stimuli in their commercial lending
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and faced a decreased in the number of loans issued based on growth in Total Deposits.
It must be noted here that, collectively, the small banks only participated in one of the 
stimulus programs, based on Table 10. Second, the medium-sized banks experienced 
significant, but small and negative impact from the CPP program of TARP program and 
even greater and positive significance from growth in Total Deposits. Third, the large 
banks were able to increase commercial lending activity based on the significant result 
from participation in the CPFF, Commercial Paper Funding Facility, but not any other 
programs or the bank’s own deposits.
[Insert Table 13 here]
Table 14 reflects the regression results using the change in the number of 
commercial loans as the dependent variable and splits the sample by the seven banks 
who had decreases in lending compared to the 18 banks that had increases in lending.
The results show that the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of TARP, SCAP, and Total 
Deposits significantly influenced those banks that had decreases in lending. However, the 
SCAP impact was again negative. Related to the 18 banks that had increases in lending, 
the results show that the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), SCAP, TAF, and 
Total Deposits significantly influenced their lending.
[Insert Table 14 here]
The event study analysis captured two single dates and one twin period for each 
bank’s participation in the stated credit stimuli, as described above. First, I analyzed the 
date of the actual loan transaction even though, in three of the five programs in which our 
sample of banks participated, the public was not informed of the participation on this date. 
Second, the twin period between the date of the actual loan transaction and the date of the
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release of information was analyzed. Third, I analyzed the date of the release of 
information only. Table 15 reflects the mean cumulative abnormal returns for this analysis.
[Insert Table 15 here]
On the date of the actual loan transaction, the market reacted in an equal split of 
positive and negative significant results based on the Market Model and in a fully positive 
significant way based on the Market-adjusted Return Model. The market’s response was 
both positive and significant under both models to the banks’ that participated in the Asset- 
Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the 
Term Auction Facility (TAF). However, the reaction was mixed when banks participated in 
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) in that the Market Model brought forth 
negative and significant abnormal returns while the Market-adjusted Model produced a 
positive and significant result. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the largest bank 
program under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), drew a negative reaction from 
the market based on the date of the transaction. Under the Market Model, the market had 
a significant - 28.9% reaction to the banks that exchanged preferred stock or debt 
securities for the capital infusions. For this same program, the report from the Market- 
adjusted Return Model was that the market had an insignificant, though negative, reaction. 
The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) also produced insignificant results 
under one model and significant results under the other model. In this case, the Market 
Model results are insignificant and the Market-adjusted Return Model reflects positive 
cumulative abnormal return of 35.1 % in reaction to the banks’ participation in SCAP or 
better known as “stress tests”. Even though three programs (i.e. AMLF, CPFF, and TAF) 
did not release information to the public on or near the date of the transactions, the market
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had clear and significant reactions on the banks’ participation in three of the programs (i.e. 
AMLF, CPFF, and TAF). With regard to the two programs (i.e. CPP and SCAP) that did 
release information to the public on or near the transaction date, the results were split by 
significance on one model and insignificance on the other model. A look at the twin-date 
analysis could provide more insights as to whether the public knew of the transactions 
affected their reaction to the news of a banks’ participation in the credit stimuli.
As reported on Table 15, the event study analysis of the twin-date period show 
primarily positive and significant market reaction under both models for the programs in 
which our sample of banks participated. Whereas participants in the AMLF program 
received positive and significant market reaction under both models, the banks that 
participated in the CPFF and TAF programs received negative reaction under the Market 
Model and positive and significant reactions under the Market-adjusted Returns Model.
The discrepancy between the models is not determinable, but the significance levels show 
that both reactions were strong.
On the dates of the release of the information to the public after the transaction 
date, I analyzed the market’s reaction to the participants and the non-participants in the 
program. The market’s reaction was positive and significant for both participants and non­
participants in all programs. It is interesting to note that, though the program participants 
and non-participants got the same positive or negative reaction from the market, the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the non-participants are consistently less than that of the 
participants in the program on the release date under both models. It appears that there 
was an overall greater positive reaction from the market to the participation of the sample 
of banks in the general credit stimulus programs than that for non-participants.
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With regard to the specific support that was provided to four of the U.S. commercial 
banks in the sample, Table 16 presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns. The 
analysis shows primarily insignificant results under both models. Positive and significant 
market reaction occurred under the Market Model in response to the Federal Reserve’s 
support and approval, respectively, of Citigroup and Wells Fargo in the purchase of 
Wachovia. However, negative and significant market reactions surfaced under both 
models in reference to the announcement of the joint agreement by the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the FDIC to provide non-recourse loans as aid to Bank of America. In 
fact, the market spoke loudly in reaction to that aid with mean cumulative abnormal returns 
of approximately - 80.00% under both models.
[Insert Table 16 here]
Results and Discussion
Using loan-level data from ThomsonOne of 1,977 loans in the stimulus period 
and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, I analyze the 25 U.S.-based commercial 
banks that issued commercial loans during both periods. Through the univariate 
analysis, I find that commercial lending increased by $236 billion in the stimulus period 
over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of 6.75% on the $3,493 trillion 
invested by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and government agencies. The 
regression analysis shows significant impact of the credit stimuli on the increase in the 
number and/or value of the loan transactions for five of the six credit stimuli studied. In 
addition, the event study results show primarily positive and significant market reaction 
to the commercial banks’ participation in the credit stimuli. Not only does the increase
53
in lending during the stimulus period contribute a new finding to the financial literature, 
but also the significant influence of the credit stimuli in the United States sheds new 
light on the response of U.S.-based commercial banks.
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C W M P T ER 4  
THE RESPONSE OF EU-BASED COMMERCIAL BANKS 
TO CREDIT STIMULI 
Literature Review
The 2008 financial crisis that started in the United States went global as it spread 
to the countries of the world. The European Union (EU) was no exception. Of the 27 
member countries of the EU as of December 31, 2007 (EU, 2013), France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom, the largest countries of the union, are the focus of this research 
as they also represent the highest levels of lending activity in the two comparative 
periods. This study of lending in the EU begins with a review of the monetary 
relationships of the EU with the three countries of focus (i.e. EU3).
Though each of the member countries has a monetary relationship with the EU, 
only 15 of the 27 member countries have adopted the euro as their national currency. 
France and Germany, as adopters of the euro as the currency of their country, follow the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Though the ECB sets monetary 
policy, the national central banks of France and Germany implement that policy and 
perform other roles under the direction of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). The United Kingdom (U.K.), though a member of the EU, has not adopted the 
euro, but retains the Great Britain pound (GBP) as its national currency and the Bank of 
England (BoE) as its central bank for setting monetary policy for the U.K. (ECB, 2008). 
Therefore, this research captures the monetary policy actions of the ECB and the BoE.
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Initially, the ECB’s policy response to the 2008 financial crisis was one of crisis 
control and mitigation with first steps on the redesign of financial regulation and 
supervision. However, it quickly became clear that financial institutions in the member 
countries needed financial assistance from guarantees on deposits to specific support to 
regain consumer trust in a coordinated effort. (European Commission, 2009). This 
coordination developed into broad measures of the ECB such as swap line agreements 
with other countries, lowering of key interest rates, and stress tests of financial institution 
stability. At the member governmental level, coordinated policy actions took the form of 
state guarantees, recapitalization programs, loans, and individual rescue of specific 
financial institutions. The Bank of England, in developing monetary policy for the U.K., 
followed a similar model (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). It is not yet clear whether or not 
how this coordinated effort is offset by the differences in implementation.
Within the EU, Stolz and Wedow (2011) uncovered different approaches to policy 
implementation. They found that, while the EU made the acceptance of capital injections 
voluntary, the French government, for example, made such injections mandatory. They 
also point out that the Members of the EU were split between a focus on addressing the 
issues in the broad financial system and attention to the needs of individual financial 
institutions. Lastly, Stolz and Wedow (2011) highlight that, within the EU, the limits on 
deposit insurance coverage ranged widely. From those findings, it is safe to conclude 
that coordination efforts could be enhanced for greater consistency.
In addition, it must be noted that the ECB and BoE implemented quantitative 
easing efforts in the form of the purchase of covered bonds and gilt-edged securities (or 
government bonds), respectively. Those actions are excluded from the scope of this 
research. The specifics of the resulting actions are found in Tables 3 and 4.
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To gain insights into the existing literature on the monetary policy actions of the 
ECB, BoE, and the governments of the EU3, this literature review captures the streams 
of literature on the approach and the effectiveness of the EU response to the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) look at monetary policies of three central 
banks - European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, and Bank of England - and observe 
both similarities and differences among the actions of the three institutions. They state 
that the key differences between the ECB and other entities is that the ECB already had 
a larger balance sheet than the Federal Reserve and the BoE and did not have to 
increase its balance sheet to address the elevated demand for central bank liquidity. In 
addition, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) state that the ECB dealt primarily with the 
banking system while the Federal Reserve dealt with a wide range of counterparties. 
Those differences in monetary policy approach could have an impact on its effectiveness 
to positively influence bank lending.
With regard to the effectiveness of credit stimuli in the EU on bank lending, I 
found existing literature on Germany and the U.K. to provide background for this 
analysis. Gern and Jannsen (2009), in their study of whether a credit crunch occurred in 
the U.S., Germany, and the Euro area, found that access to credit in Germany was 
actually better than in the previous credit crisis and therefore, no credit crunch existed in 
Germany during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, Hall (2009) in his analysis of 
the U.K.’s January 2009 bank bailout efforts was comparing to the unsuccessful results 
of the October 2008 efforts. Based on the components of the package, which includes 
government insurance against the failure of “bad banks” and the extension of time limits 
on the Credit Guarantee Scheme, to name a few, Hall (2009) concludes that this second 
attempt at rescue will also not be effective in increasing lending unless it contains more
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nationalization-style efforts. Bell and Young (2010) further those concerns as they 
suggest that the weakness in bank lending in the U.K. is the result of a combination of 
tighter credit supply and weaker credit demand. Overall, a mixed message from the EU.
Based on the above review of the existing financial literature and the actions of 
the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and governments of the three countries of 
study, this chapter addresses the research question of, “Did France-, Germany-, and 
United Kingdom-based commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased 
lending during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 when 
compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 
five years prior”?
Given that the univariate analysis in Chapter 2 shows that lending increased6 
overall for the sample of data in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period 
of the EU3 and the existing literature did not report on comparative periods outside of the 
stimulus period, I hypothesize that the change in commercial lending in the stimulus period 
will be greater than commercial lending in the non-stimulus period. The null hypothesis is 
that lending in the stimulus period will be less than or equal to commercial lending in the 
non-stimulus period based on the credit stimuli offered by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), Bank of England (BoE), and governments of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom (EU3). If the results show a rejection of the null hypothesis, then lending 
increased in the stimulus period and it will appear that commercial banks responded 
positively to the credit stimuli. The results will be uncovered through the research 
methodology.
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Data and Methodology
To test this hypothesis, I use loan-level data from the ThomsonOne database. 
The 754 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 
and 698 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 
2006 are those issued by commercial banks based in the European Union countries of 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The loans were selected based on dates of 
funding requests and ultimate approval in the stated periods. This use of loan-level data 
and the comparison of time periods five years apart represent a significant break from 
most of the existing literature, which generally either uses aggregate data within the 
financial crisis time period or includes only a short interval prior to the crisis. In addition, 
though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that actual loan origination data is needed for 
analysis of the credit activity of commercial banks, one can agree that this loan-level 
data provides more detail than summary balance sheet or aggregate data. In addition, 
this author believes that the non-stimulus period represents a valid control period to 
which to compare the responses of the lenders to the central bank’s actions during the 
stimulus period.
The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level 
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the 
stated periods. Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of the 
change in lending for each lender. As the database of loans includes both transactions 
by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a lender included in 
the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though the other lenders in 
the syndicate were excluded from the sample. However, only the amount of the 
transaction contributed by the EU-based lender headquartered in France, Germany, or
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UK was counted in the loan activity. Initially, the sample of lenders included both 
commercial and non-bank financial institutions.
To capture the lending activity of the lenders that are EU-based commercial 
banks, I utilized the entity’s primary SIC code and researched entity trading status and 
relationships. Non-publicly traded commercial banks were excluded from the sample as 
well as all entities with non-EU parents. The original sample of 32 EU-based lenders 
became 19 commercial banks or subsidiaries, which were subsequently grouped into 
nine parent commercial banks as the trading entity. The lending response of the 10 
subsidiaries was included with that of the nine respective parent banks in both periods of 
study, regardless of when the relationship began, to capture comparative total loan-level 
activity. Table 17 reflects the summary statistics of the key characteristics of the EU3- 
based commercial banks in the resulting sample.
[Insert Table 17 here]
As shown on Table 17, the nine EU3-based commercial banks were separated 
into size groupings for this analysis. The size groupings were based on the average of 
the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus and non-stimulus period, 
respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks in each size 
category for each period to allow for the calculation of the change in lending activity for 
each bank. Due to the growth in total assets from the non-stimulus period to the stimulus 
period, in which the size of most of the banks doubled, the groupings are different for 
each period, as is reflected on Table 17. (NOTE: However, it is coincidental that each 
size group has the same number of banks).
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Also shown on Table 17 are statistics on participation in stimulus programs, 
number of commercial loan transactions, and the value contributed to the commercial 
loan transactions by the banks in the size category. The statistics on participation in 
stimulus programs relate to the maximum number of stimulus programs in which the 
banks in the size grouping participated. Nine of the credit stimulus programs of the ECB, 
BoE, and governments of the EU3 are included in the count of programs on Table 17, 
based on the availability of participation details. However, the sample of EU3-based 
commercial banks also participated in two U.S. Federal Reserve programs that are 
excluded from the analysis in Table 17, but captured in the regression analysis for a 
determination of the impact on commercial lending. The change in the number and value 
of loans provides the data for the dependent variables in the regression analysis.
Regression analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
various independent variables and the change in the number of loan transactions and 
the change in the value of the bank’s contribution to the loans as the dependent 
variables. The dependent variable was calculated to capture the change in the number 
and value of the loans, as follows:
ChginNumjt Nzijjiber o f  locLTLS^ i^rjluiu  ^period Number o f  locins /^on—stimulus Period
or (9)
ChginValjt =  Value o f loans ($ m il)stimuius Period -
Value o f loans ($ niiV)^on_Sfimuius period
In line with the determination by Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) that quarterly 
data is needed to determine the short-term impact of monetary policy on lending, each 
calculation was performed on a quarterly basis with the corresponding quarter five years
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prior to the stimulus period date. For example, change in the number or value of loans 
signed during the quarter of October 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 in the stimulus 
period were offset by the number or value of loans signed during the quarter of October 
1, 2002 through December 31, 2002 in the non-stimulus period. This pattern continued 
through the 16 quarters that ended July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011, which was 
offset by the loan activity during the quarter of July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006.
The independent variables of the regressions were also captured on a quarterly 
basis and reflect the nine ECB, BoE, and government credit stimuli programs as well as 
the two U.S. Federal Reserve programs for which participation data was available and 
the EU3 commercial banks participated. The nine ECB and EU3 programs of analysis 
include one program by the French government, two programs by the German 
government, four programs by the UK central bank (i.e. Bank of England) or government, 
one program of the ECB; and a measure to capture the increase in deposit insurance 
offered by each entity. France offered the injection of subordinated debt capital program, 
which is referenced in the regression analysis as “SubDebtFR”. Germany offered a state 
guarantee program (GuaranteeWG) and a recapitalization program (RecapWG). The 
United Kingdom, through either its separately functioning central bank or government, 
offered the following four programs: (1) Capital injection program of UK (Capinject(UK);
(2) Conversion of preferred to common equity program of UK (ConversionUK); (3) 
Recapitalization program of United Kingdom (RecapUK); and (4) Special Liquidity 
Scheme of UK (SLSUK). Though the ECB offered many programs of general credit 
stimuli, the participation of those general programs could not be attributed to individual 
banks. Therefore, only the Stress Tests of the ECB (StressTestECB) are included in the 
testing as the many of the sample of banks in this study participated in the tests. Lastly,
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Total Deposits are included in the regression analysis as a measure of the effect of the 
stimulus action of increasing the deposit insurance limit. The two U.S. Federal Reserve 
programs in which the EU3 participated and that are included in the analysis are: (1) 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFFUS) and (2) the Term Auction Facility 
(TAFUS). Tables 1, 3, and 4 provide a description of each of the U.S. and EU programs.
The resulting regression model is as follows:
ChginNumjt or ChginValjt =
<Xj +  /?! Sub Debt FRjt 
+  p2 Guar ante eW Gjt +  /?3 RecapWG/t +  /?4 CapinjectUKjt 
+  p5 ConversionUKjt +  /?6 RecapUKjt +  p7 SLSUKjt 
+  p8 StressTestECBjt +  p9 Total_DepositSjt +
p10 Bank Fixed E ffec ts  +  P ^T im e  Fixed E ffects  +  ejt> (10)
where ChginNum is the change in the number of loan transactions for the jth bank during 
quarter t and ChginVal is the change in the value of contribution made to the loan 
transactions for the j*  bank during quarter t; 3 is a parameter that measures the 
sensitivity of each independent variable to the dependent variable. SubDebtFRjt, 
GuaranteeWGj,, RecapWGjt, CapinjectUKjt, ConversionUKjt, RecapUKjt, and SLSUKjt 
capture the dollar value of the bank’s, j, participation in the stated credit stimuli program 
during the quarter, t. StressTestECBjt participation is reflected as a dummy variable 
during the quarter of the release of the results as it represents the stress tests that were 
performed in the EU by the European Central Bank. Total_Depositsjt reflect the level of 
total deposits of the bank, j, during the quarter, t. (NOTE: When only semiannual data
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was provided by a sample bank, the balance of total deposits from the preceding period 
was used as the quarterly total. Given the rolling nature of this balance sheet account, 
the author does not foresee a material impact of this approach on the regression results). 
ejt is a random variable that, by construction, must have an expected value of zero, and 
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables.
This methodology also includes attention to the impact of the differences between 
the commercial banks and quarterly periods of the sample, as well as the endogenous 
nature of the bank lending decision. To address the differences between the commercial 
banks, bank fixed effects were included in the regression model. To address the 
differences between the quarterly periods, time fixed effects were included in the model. 
In following the approach of Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz, (2012wp), 
endogeneity in the bank lending decision was addressed by lagging the data in each 
independent variable by one quarter.
After the initial regression analysis was conducted on the impact of the nine ECB 
and EU3 credit stimuli, it was determined that the GuaranteeWG and RecapWG 
programs of Germany were highly correlated with the other variables and resulted in 
biased results. Therefore, those programs were removed from the analysis and the 
results were reproduced without bias. The modified regression model is as follows:
ChginNurrijt or ChginValjt =  
ccj +  SubDebtFRJt +  /?2 CapinjectUKjt +  /?3 ConversionUKjt +
RecapUKjt +  fis SLSUKjt +  /?6 StressTestECB +  (37 Total_DepositSjt +
Bank Fixed E ffec ts  +  /?9 Time Fixed E ffec ts  +  €jt (11)
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To determine the impact on commercial lending based on the participation of the 
EU3 in the two U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs, the regression model was 
modified to include those programs, as follows:
ChginNunijt or ChginValjt =  
a.j +  /?! SubDebtFRjt 4- CapinjectUKjt 4- /?3 ConversionUKjt 
4- /?4 RecapUKjt 4- /?5 SLSUKj, +  /?6 StressTestECB 
4- /?7 Total_DepositSjt +  /?8 CPFFUSjt +  TAFUSjt 
+  /?9 Bank Fixed E ffec ts  +  /?10 Time Fixed E ffects  +  €jt> (12)
In addition, regression analysis was conducted on other bases and stock price 
trends were reviewed as part of the testing. Using Equation (12), I conducted regressions 
of the sample of commercial banks split by size and by decreases versus increases in the 
number of loan transactions. I also charted the stock price trend during the stimulus period 
for a visual of the market’s reaction to the EU3-based commercial banks. Overall, the 
analysis was done to determine the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending from 
various perspectives.
Analysis of the Data
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 18 through 20. 
Table 18 shows the impact of the credit stimuli independent variables on the dependent 
variables of the change in the number of loan transactions, in columns (1) and (2) and 
the change in the value of the bank’s contribution to the loan transaction in columns (3)
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and (4). Tables 19 and 20 again use the change in the number of loan transactions as 
the dependent variable, but Table 19 splits the sample by size of bank, while Table 20 
splits the sample by the banks that had a decrease or an increase as the change in 
lending. The data tells the story of the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending.
In Table 18, the participation of the sample of banks in ECB and/or EU3 credit 
stimuli is complemented by participation in U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs. 
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 18, only the ECB and EU3 credit stimuli programs are 
captured as independent variables. The dependent variables are the change in the 
number of loan transaction in column (1) and the change in the value in column (3). In 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 18, the two U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs 
are added to the model to determine if there is any change in impact. However, the only 
independent variable of significance in all four of the models is the SLSUK (or the 
Special Liquidity Scheme of the UK), which provided $1.2 trillion of liquidity to two of the 
banks in the sample. This author reasons that such a substantial boost to liquidity 
contributed to the increase in commercial lending for the two participating commercial 
banks. One point of note is that when ChginNum is the dependent variable (i.e. in 
columns (1) and (2)), SLSUK is significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, when 
ChginVal is the dependent variable (i.e. in columns (3) and (4)), SLSUK is significant at 
the 10% level, but with a higher impact based on the coefficient on the variable. The 
results on Table 18 reflect the full sample of the data and the only significance.
[Insert Table 18 here]
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When the data is split into smaller samples, as in Tables 19 and 20, the result is 
that none of the credit stimulus programs shows any significant impact on the dependent 
variable of the change in the number of loan transactions. In Table 19, the sample is 
split into size groupings of small, medium, and large based on the total assets ranges 
shown in Table 17. In Table 20, the sample is split based on whether the change in the 
number of loan transactions was a decrease or an increase. Not only is there no 
significance among the independent variables, but also correlation issues resulted in the 
removal of certain variables from the model. Those models are marked as “n/a” in the 
table. Overall, the increase in commercial lending in the three countries of the European 
Union is not in response to the credit stimuli of neither the ECB and/or EU3 nor the U.S.
[Insert Table 19 here]
[Insert Table 20 here]
With no significance in the regression analysis, I sought to determine if the 
market had a positive or negative reaction to the sample banks’ based on changes in the 
stock price. Though event-study analysis would provide more information, none is 
performed due to the reality of insignificance in the regressions. However, Figure 10 
provides graphic verification that the market seemingly had a negative reaction to the 
sample of banks during the stimulus period.
[Insert Figure 10 here]
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Results and Discussion
Based on the results of this chapter, I find that my hypothesis is not supported. 
Commercial lending in the stimulus period was greater than that of the non-stimulus 
period, as shown in Table 17. However, Tables 18 through 20 show that the portion of the 
$4,286 trillion in credit stimuli tested in this research did not contribute to that increase in 
commercial lending. Though the Special Liquidity Scheme of the UK (SLSUK) showed 
significance in Table 18, the other eight credit stimuli tested were insignificant in impact on 
either of the dependent variables related to the increase in commercial lending. The 
approach of the ECB and EU3 to the distribution of the credit stimuli could be a factor.
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C H A P T E R  5 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation called upon the theory of financial intermediation (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983) and the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995) to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars of 
innovations offered by central banks and governments to stimulate the credit markets 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, building on the approaches used in 
existing literature, I used loan-level data of commercial lending and conduct univariate, 
regression, and event-study analyses to address the research question of, “Did United 
States- and European Union-based commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with 
increased commercial lending during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through 
September 30, 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 
through September 30, 2006 five years prior?” In a comparison of the stimulus and non­
stimulus periods, the univariate analysis revealed that total commercial loan demand 
decreased by 3.5% in quantity, but increased by 2.2% in dollar value. In addition, total 
commercial loan supply increased by 17% in quantity and by 35% in dollar value in the 
same period-to-period comparison. However, further analysis answered the research 
question on whether or not this increase in commercial loan supply was in response to 
the credit stimuli.
With regard to the theoretical foundation of this research, as presented in 
Chapter 2, the results vary by geographic region. In the U.S., the commercial banks did 
fulfill their role as creators of liquidity with demand deposits, which showed significant
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regression results, as the theory of financial intermediation states (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983). However, deposits were not a significant factor of the increased 
commercial lending for the EU-based commercial banks. In relation to the bank lending 
channel component of the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), the existence of the channel was dependent upon finding 
increases in economic output, bank lending, and bank security holdings as a result of 
expansionary monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). This research specifically 
addressed the increase in bank lending as evidence of the effectiveness of the bank 
lending channel. With that view, the bank lending channel was effective in the U.S. as 
the findings show significance for the influence of credit stimuli (i.e. monetary policy) on 
the increase in commercial lending. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy on 
the bank lending channel in the EU3 (i.e. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) is 
not seen as no significance was found in the credit stimuli in relation to the increase in 
commercial lending in the three countries of the EU. Future research will examine other 
factors that might have influenced the increase in commercial lending in the stimulus 
period over the non-stimulus period in the European Union. The results of this research 
show that both theories were in operation for the United States-based commercial 
banks during the 2008 global financial crisis.
In Chapter 3 , 1 examined the response of United States-based commercial banks 
to the credit stimuli introduced by the United States (U.S.) Federal Reserve System and 
agencies of the Federal government. Using loan-level data from ThomsonOne of 1,977 
loans in the stimulus period and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, I analyzed the 
25 U.S.-based commercial banks that issued commercial loans during both periods. 
Through the univariate analysis, I found that commercial lending increased by $236 
billion in the stimulus period over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of
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6.75% on the $3,493 trillion invested by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and 
government agencies. The regression analysis showed significant impact of the credit 
stimuli on the increase in the number and/or value of the loan transactions for five of the 
six credit stimuli studied. In addition, the event study results showed primarily positive 
and significant market reaction to the commercial banks’ participation in the credit 
stimuli. Not only does the increase in lending during the stimulus period contribute a 
new finding to the financial literature, but also the significant influence of the credit 
stimuli in the United States shed new light on the response of U.S.-based commercial 
banks.
In Chapter 4 , 1 conducted loan-level analysis on 754 commercial loans in the 
stimulus period and 698 commercial loans in the non-stimulus period issued by nine 
commercial banks based in the European Union (EU) countries of France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom (U.K.) (referred to collectively as “EU3”). Through the univariate 
analysis, I found that commercial lending increased by $18 billion in the stimulus period 
over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of 0.42% on the $4,286 trillion 
invested by the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and the governments of each 
of the three countries of analysis. However, the regression analysis reported a lack of 
significance in eight of the nine stimulus programs studied. Significant results were 
obtained for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) offered by the U.K., which provided $1.2 
trillion of liquidity to two of the banks in the sample. This author reasons that such a 
substantial boost to liquidity contributed to the increase in commercial lending for the two 
participating commercial banks. However, the overall increase in commercial lending in 
the three countries of the European Union is not in response to the credit stimuli.
71
Based on the stated research results, I conclude that the effectiveness of the 
credit stimuli in the U.S. versus the ineffectiveness of that of the EU could relate to the 
approach of each region with regard to the adjustment of key interest rates and the 
breadth and depth of the financial institutions reached with the stimuli. The reduction of 
the spread in the key interest rates of the U.S. started in Augusto 2007 and went as low 
as 25 basis points from its 100 basis-point pre-crisis level. However, adjustments by the 
European Central Banks (ECB) to the key rates in the EU started in October 2008 and 
did not change its spread between the rates at any time. In addition, in the U.S., credit 
stimuli were provided broadly with more general eligibility to financial institutions with 
various reaches into the capital markets than in the EU, which focused much of its stimuli 
funds on specific financial institutions. Many of those specific financial institutions of the 
EU were not commercial banks during the period of this study or did not make 
commercial loans during both the stimulus and non-stimulus periods. Therefore, those 
financial institutions are excluded from this research and the benefit that they might have 
gained from the credit stimuli of the EU is not captured. In the end, the specific approach 
of the EU did not have a significant influence on commercial lending, while the broad 
approach of the United States to credit stimuli did have a significant influence on U.S.- 
based commercial banks.
Other differences between US-, and EU-, based banks could have led to these 
research results. Using data from over 80 countries, Aisen and Franken (2010), found 
that regions with trading partners with lower GDP growth, certain structural 
characteristics, and use of counter-cyclical monetary policy had the greatest impact on 
lending during the crisis. Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2010) also 
performed cross-country research in their look at 58 advanced countries and emerging
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markets and observed that the crisis hit the U.S. in a clear timeline while other countries 
experienced a less clear start on the impact of the crisis and, therefore, a later reaction 
occurred. They add that the delayed response, financial liberalization in many countries, 
and underpriced deposit insurance led to greater risk-taking by the banks. In addition, 
Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) and Stolz and Wedow (2010) state that the ECB dealt 
primarily with the banking system while the Federal Reserve dealt with a wide range of 
counterparties. Zhang (2013) states that the undercapitalization of EU banks compared 
to US banks has been and remains a problem. Though the stated factors were not 
tested in this research, it is important to note other reasons why the U.S. and EU results 
might have differed.
Overall, these results open the door to more questions that will require future 
research. First, future research is needed to answer the question of, “Did the financial 
institutions throughout the European Union that received targeted credit stimuli respond 
with increased lending?” Second, this author is curious about the approach to credit 
stimuli distribution and the lending response used in other countries, such as Canada, 
Australia, and Japan, as examples of countries with high levels of commercial lending. 
Third, given that the programs of Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist were excluded 
from this study, future research will explore whether or not those programs had the 
anticipated negative effect on commercial lending. Lastly, in their study of lending of 
activity from 1999:Q1 through 2008:Q4, Contessi and Francis (2009) conclude that credit 
issued by the entire population of regulated commercial banks contracted more than it 
expanded. However, they qualify their conclusions with the reality that their measures of 
loan activity for 2008 may have shown different results if affected by the programs 
implemented by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury. That statement leads one to an
idea for further research about the counterfactual impact of monetary policy actions. In 
keeping with Contessi and Francis’ (2009) view, further research will answer the research 
question of, “What might have been the lending status without the credit stimuli of the 
central banks and governments?” These research questions will be answered through 
the validity of empirical research.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Summary of U.S. Credit Stimuli, by date
To stimulate financial institutions to exercise their financial intermediary role in the 
economy, the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Department of Treasury offered 
the listed 20 programs during the period of August 17, 2007 through September 30, 
2011. Multiple actions were taken under most programs. Some stimulus programs 
continued through December 2012 and beyond.
SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf
Name of Program Date of First Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Reduction of Spread 
between Key 
Lending Rates
August 17, 
2007 7
Primary credit discount window 
rate reduced from 6.25% to 5.75%, 
which resulted in a spread of 50 
basis points with the Federal 
Funds rate. That spread was 
maintained throughout the financial 
crisis.
Lowering of Target 
Federal Funds Rate
September 18, 
2007 25
Target range of Federal Funds 
Rate initially reduced from 5.25% 
to 4.75%. By 2008, the range was 
set at 0.00% to 0.25% and was 
maintained at that level.
Term Auction 
Facility (TAF)
December 12, 
2007 13
First auction took place for $20 bn 
of 28-day credit. In Feb 2008, 
auctions increased to $30 bn every 
two weeks and with longer terms. 
84-day credit increased to $75 bn. 
Overall, TAF funding increased to 
$900 bn.
Swap Line 
Agreements
December 12, 
2007 (for 
liquidity lines) 
and 
April 6, 2009 
(for foreign 
currency 
agreements)
14
Swap lines and agreements were 
opened with the European Central 
Bank ($210 bn+), Swiss National 
Bank ($7 bn+), Bank of Australia, 
Sverige Rilksbank, Norges Bank, 
Bank of Japan (no cap), Brazil ($30 
bn), Mexico ($30 bn), Korea ($30 
bn), and Singapore ($30 bn). In 
September 2009, total swap lines 
doubled to $620 bn.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program Date of First 
Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Troubled Asset 
Relief Program 
(TARP)/ Capital 
Purchase Program 
(CPP)
February 13, 
2008 
(and 
October 3, 
2008)
2
In execution of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
TARP was funded with $700 bn 
total. An estimated $331 bn was 
made available to commercial 
banks with the Treasury Department 
using $250 billion to purchase 
senior preferred shares of financial 
institutions under the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP)
Term Securities 
Lending Facility 
(TSLF)/TSLF 
Options Program 
(TOP)
March 11, 
2008 5
This weekly auction program was 
funded to lend up to $200 bn of 
Treasury securities, as well as 
options to draw upon TSLF loans, to 
primary dealers secured by other 
securities for a term of 28 days 
rather than overnight. Program 
closed on February 1, 2010.
Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility 
(PDCF)
March 16, 
2008 2
PDCF offered overnight loans that 
totaled about $9 bn to primary 
dealers to provide liquidity in the 
market for U.S. Treasury securities. 
Program closed on February 1, 
2010
Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper 
Money Market 
Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF)
September 19, 
2008 1
This program allowed eligible 
financial institutions to borrow $217 
bn in funds to purchase asset- 
backed commercial paper to restore 
liquidity to that market. Program 
closed on February 1, 2010.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program Date of First 
Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Interest Payments 
on Required and 
Excess Reserves
October 6, 
2008 3
Interest was paid on average 
required reserve balances and 
average excess balances 
maintained over a reserve 
maintenance period. Rate paid on 
excess reserves started at 75 basis 
points less than the targeted federal 
funds rate. Rate increased by 
0.40% later in October 2008 and 
again in November 2008.
Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility 
(CPFF)
October 7, 
2008 0
Through a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), this facility was funded with 
$2.3 trillion to purchase three-month 
unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial paper directly from 
eligible issuers. Program closed on 
February 1,2010.
Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program October 14, 2008 0
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) provides 
insurance on newly issued senior 
unsecured debt of eligible financial 
institutions and full coverage of non­
interest bearing deposit transaction 
accounts, regardless of dollar 
amount. Program closed on 
October 31,2009.
Change in the 
Definition of Tier 1 
capital
October 15, 
2008 0
Definition changed to include in 
Tier 1 capital the $250 bn of senior 
preferred shares purchased under 
the Treasury Department's Capital 
Purchase Program through TARP. 
SOURCE:
http://www .federal reserve .gov/news 
events/press/bcreg/20081020a. htm
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program Date of First 
Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Money Market 
Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF)
October 21, 
2008 0
A maximum amount of $600 bn was 
made available to special purpose 
vehicles to purchase certain money 
market instruments from eligible 
institutions. The Federal Reserve 
provided 90% of the funding and the 
private sector provided 10%. 
SOURCE:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
mmiff_faq.html
Agency Mortgage- 
Backed Securities 
(MBS) Program
November
2008 2
The low target for the Federal Funds 
rate led the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) to expand its 
holdings of mortgage-backed 
securities guaranteed by Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. 
$1.25 trillion in agency MBS were 
purchased
Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF)
November 25, 
2008 8
TALF provided loans initially 
collateralized only by AAA asset- 
backed securities and later accepted 
a wider range of collateral. This 
program was jointly conducted with 
the Department of Treasury, which 
used TARP funds for its 
participation. Total of $1 trillion was 
set aside for the program.
Supervisory Capital 
Assessment 
Program (SCAP) 
(also referred to as 
"stress tests”)
February 23, 
2009 2
In a joint effort conducted by the 
Federal Reserve and four 
governmental agencies, an 
assessment of the capital status of 
19 of the largest bank holding 
companies (BHCs) was conducted 
to determine the need for capital 
infusions. Ten of the 19 BHCs 
needed capital. Only one of the 10 
needed government capital. The 
other nine obtained private capital.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program Date of First 
Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Redemption of 
Treasury Capital June 1,2009 0
The 19 BHCs that participated in 
SCAP were allowed to redeem the 
U.S. Treasury capital with certain 
considerations in place. This 
"stock buy-back" was approved if, 
for example, the BHC could prove 
that it could continue to perform its 
intermediary role.
Legacy Securities 
Public-Private 
Investment Program 
(PPIP)
July 8, 2009 0
The Treasury Department 
committed $22.1 bn and partnered 
with nine PPIFs in the private 
sector to put capital back into the 
market for legacy securities. The 
goal of PPIP was to help financial 
institutions begin to remove these 
assets from their balance sheets so 
that funds could be re-deploy as 
new credit to households and 
businesses.
Term Deposit Facility 
(TDF)
May 10, 2010 
(NOTE: Reg 
D was 
amended on 
December 28, 
2009)
13
With maturities extended to as long 
as 84 days, term deposits allowed 
eligible institutions to participate in 
a series of small-value auctions of 
$1 bn to $5 bn of term deposits. 
This program has been continued 
beyond the scope of this study.
Changes in FDIC 
Deposit Insurance 
Coverage Issued
July 21, 2010 2
After the July 2010 signing of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC 
permanently raised the maximum 
deposit insurance amount to 
$250,000 per depositor, per 
institution. On November 9, 2010, 
a ruling allowed for unlimited 
insurance coverage of noninterest- 
bearing transaction accounts 
beginning December 31, 2010 
through December 31, 2012.
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Table 2: Summary of U.S. Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, 
by date
Given the potential impact on the financial markets if certain financial institutions failed, the 
Federal Reserve and other government departments provided specific credit stimuli. This 
table summarizes the financial institutions that benefited from those targeted programs.
SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf
Financial institution Description of Action Date of First Action
J.P. Morgan Approved purchase of Bear Stearns March 14, 2008
Bank of America Approved purchase of Countrywide June 5, 2008
Goldman Sach (GS) Approved as a bank holding company September 21, 2008
Morgan Stanley (MS) Approved as a bank holding company
September 21, 
2008
Merrill Lynch Authorized lending to Merrill Lynch at the primary credit rate
September 21, 
2008
Citigroup
Agreed to provide liquidity to aid in the 
Wachovia purchase (NOTE: Wells Fargo 
ultimately purchased Wachovia).
September 29, 
2008
Wells Fargo
Approved purchase of Wachovia. (NOTE: 
Wells Fargo's offer was chosen by Wachovia 
over that of Citigroup).
October 12, 
2008
Bank of America Agreed jointly with Treasury and FDIC to provide non-recourse loan as aid
January 16, 
2009
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Table 3: Summary of EU Credit Stimuli, by date
To stimulate financial institutions to exercise their financial intermediary role in the economy, 
the European Central Bank, the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
as well as the Bank of England, offered the listed 27 credit stimuli programs during the period 
of August 17, 2007 through September 30, 2011. Multiple actions were taken under most 
programs. Some stimulus programs continued through December 2012 and beyond. Panel A 
captures the credit stimulus actions of the European Central Bank. Panel B reflects the 
actions taken by the government of France. Panel C presents the actions of the government 
of Germany. Panel D shows the actions taken by the Bank of England and the government of 
the U.K., which has not adopted the euro as its national currency. Conversion into U.S. dollars 
is based on the exchange rate in place on the day of the first action of the program.
SOURCE:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf and 
Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)
Panel A - European Central Bank Credit Stimuli, by date
Name of Program Date of First Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Swap Line 
Agreements
December 12, 2007 
(for liquidity lines) 
and
April 6, 2009 (for 
foreign currency 
agreements)
7
Established initial swap lines 
agreements of $20 bn with the 
U.S. Federal Reserve. Line 
values were uncapped in 
October 2008. Lines closed in 
February 2009. Foreign 
currency agreements were 
opened in April 2009.
Lowering of Key 
Interest Rates October 8, 2008 12
Cut deposit facility and 
marginal lending facility rates 
by 50 bp. Cut main refinancing 
operations rate October 15, 
2008. Subsequent actions 
continued through December 
14, 2011 when all three rates 
were set at record lows.
Stress Tests December 31,2009 2 Conducted Stress tests in May 2009 and September 2009
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Table 3: Continued
Panel B - [Government of ] France Credit Stimuli, by date
Name of Program Date of First Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
State Guarantee
Refinancing
Scheme
October 18, 2008 1
Made €360 bn (or $491 bn) 
available in debt security 
guarantees and 
recapitalizations.
Loans to Banks October 20, 2008 0
Announced a fund of €320 bn 
(or $426 bn) to provide loans to 
banks and other financial firms
Panel C - [Government of] Germany Credit Stimuli, by date
Name of Program Date of First Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Acquisition of 
impaired assets October 13, 2008 0
Purchased or acquired risk 
positions of eligible institutions 
up to €10 bn per entity. 
Maximum is €80 bn (or $109 
bn) total commitment
State Guarantee 
Scheme October 18, 2008 0
Provided guarantees for debt 
securities of eligible financial 
institutions up to €400 bn (or 
$537 bn) in total.
Recapitalization
measures December 31, 2009 0
Provided a maximum of €10 bn 
per eligible institution at 
interest rates of 7 to 9%. 
Program maximum 
commitment is €80 bn (or $115 
bn)
82
Table 3: Continued
Panel D - Bank of England Credit Stimuli for United Kingdom, by date
Name of Program Date of First Action
Number of 
Subsequent 
Actions
Program Description 
and/or Status
Increased
Deposit
Insurance
Coverage
October 3, 2008 0
Financial Services Authority 
increased deposit insurance 
coverage from £35,000 
to £50,000
Government 
Recapitalization 
Scheme (GRS)
October 8, 2008 0
Made funds available for all 
banks to raise Tier 1 capital by 
£25 bn (or $43.2 bn) combined 
to eligible institutions
Credit Guarantee 
Scheme October 13, 2008 2
Guaranteed debt of short-term 
maturity with fund of £250 bn 
(or $436 bn). Later extended 
scheme to continue through 
April 2014.
Asset Protection 
Scheme January 19, 2009 5
Announced that, for a fee, Her 
Majesty’s (HM) Treasury will 
insure risky debt held by banks 
up to £200 bn (or $295 bn) in 
total.
Swap Line 
Agreements April 6, 2009 1
Established swap line 
agreement with U.S. Federal 
Reserve System. Allowed 
lines to expire on February 1, 
2010.
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Table 4: Summary of EU Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, 
by date
Given the potential impact on the financial markets if certain financial institutions failed, the 
European Central Bank, Banque de France, and/or Bank of England provided specific credit 
stimuli. This table summarizes the financial institutions that benefited from those targeted 
programs. Conversion into U.S. dollars is based on the exchange rate in place on the day of 
the first action of the program.
SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/globaLeconomy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf and 
Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)
Panel A - France Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, by date
Financial Institution Description of Program Date of First Action
Dexia
Guaranteed 36.5% of €150 bn, which 
is an amount of €54.8 bn (or $74 bn) to 
refinance the bank in a joint agreement 
with Belgium (60.5%) and Luxembourg 
(3%).
October 9, 
2008
BNP Paribas SA Credit 
Agricole SA Societe 
Generate SA Credit Mutuel 
Caisse d'Epargne Banque 
Populaire
Injected €21.5 bn (or $27 bn) in 
subordinated debt capital for the stated 
six largest banks of France, with €10.5 
bn authorized in December 2008 and 
€10.5 bn in January 2009
December
2008
Dexia Granted another guarantee of €4.5 bn (or $6.4 bn) related to past losses
January 1, 
2009
Groupe Banque Populaire and 
Groupe Caisse d’Epargne
Government provided €5 bn (or $6.4 
bn) in debt and preference shares to 
support the merger of the two entities
February 26, 
2009
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Table 4: Continued
Panel B - Germany Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, by date
Financial Institution Description of Program Date of First Action
Aareal Bank 
BayernLB 
Commerzbank AG 
HSH Nordbank 
Hypo Real Estate 
IKB
Sicherungseinrichtungsgesellschaft 
Deutscher Banken (SdB) 
Sachsen LB 
NordLB
Provided guarantees under the State 
Guarantee Scheme to specific 
financial institutions. Commerzbank 
AG, a sample bank in this study, 
received €15 bn (or $20.135bn)
October 18, 
2008
Aareal Bank 
Commerzbank AG 
HSH Nordbank
Provided recapitalization funds to 
specific financial institutions. 
Commerzbank AG, a sample bank in 
this study, received €18.2 bn (or 
$24.43bn)
October 18, 
2008
85
Table 4: Continued
Panel C - United Kingdom Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, 
by date
Financial Institution Description of Program Date of First Action
Northern Rock
Government provided £27 bn in 
emergency loans and £30 bn (or $112 
bn total) in guarantees before 
nationalizing the bank on February 21, 
2008
February 17, 
2008
Lloyds Banking Group
Royal Bank of Scotland
Under the Bank of England’s Special 
Liquidity Scheme, allowed two banks 
to swap high-quality securities for UK 
Treasury bills for up to three years. 
Lloyds was allowed £325 bn (or $645 
bn) and RBS was allowed £260 bn (or 
$515 bn) in swaps
April 13, 2008
Bradford & Bingley
Government nationalized the bank by 
selling it to Abbey National (a sub of 
Grupo Santander)
September 27, 
2008
Abbey National PLC 
Barclays Bank PLC 
HBOS
HSBC Bank PLC 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC 
Nationwide Society 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Standard Chartered
Made funds available for all banks to 
raise Tier 1 capital by £25 bn (or $43.2 
bn) combined to eight financial 
institutions under the Government 
Recapitalization Scheme
October 8, 
2008
HBOS/Lloyds 
Royal Bank of Scotland
Government made capital injections 
totaling £37 bn (or $54.4 bn)
January 16, 
2009
Royal Bank of Scotland
HM Treasury converted preference 
shares into common equity with an 
investment of £5 bn (or $7.4 bn)
January 19, 
2009
Royal Bank of Scotland
Government provided capital injection 
of £13 bn (or $18.6 bn) in exchange for 
84% ownership
February 26, 
2009
Lloyds HM Treasury converted preference shares into common equity March 7, 2009
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Table 5: Summary of Coverage by Financial Media
Using the LexisNexis news database to search on terms of credit stimuli, bank lending, 
countries of study, Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, and other 
related words, The media articles listed below reflect a representative and random sample of 
the coverage of credit stimuli efforts and the media’s impression of the response of banks 
during 2008 through 2011. Articles with titles that named specific banks were intentionally 
excluded. The articles are listed by date to show the progression of the media’s 
interpretations.
Date Author Title
Financial Media 
Outlet
May 10, 2008 Seib, C.
ECB report shows tighter credit conditions 
across eurozone
The Times 
(London)
October 7, 
2008 (none stated) Europe's leaders fail crucial test
Australian
Financial
Review
October 14, 
2008 (none stated)
Global Bailout: Major governments at last 
embrace a common strategy for rescuing 
the international financial system
The Washington 
Post
October 14, 
2008
Fleming, S. & 
Harper, J.
Wall Street bounces back: Bank rescue 
calms markets FTSE 100 up 325 points; 
Dow soars 936 points
Daily Mail 
(London)
October 14, 
2008 Landler, M.
U.S. Investing $250 billion to bolster 
banks; Dow Surges 936 points
The New York 
Times
October 15, 
2008 Landler, M.
Bush outlines plan to invest in banks:
U.S. to spend up to $250 billion in biggest 
intervention since 1930s
The International 
Herald Tribune
October 21, 
2008 Kennedy, S.
French banks rally after $14 billion capital 
boost
MarketWatch.co
m
November 1, 
2008 (none stated)
Recession looms amid frenzied rescue 
efforts The Banker
November 
24,2008
Pittman, M. & 
Ivry, B.
U.S. Pledges Top $7.7 Trillion to Ease 
Frozen Credit (Table) Bloomberg
December
11,2008 Braude, J. U.K. proposes new stimulus Daily Deal/The 
Deal
87
Table 5: Continued
Date Author Title
Financial Media 
Outlet
February 24, 
2009
Pittman, M. & 
Ivry, B.
U.S. Bailout, Stimulus Pledges Total 
$11.6 Trillion (Table) Bloomberg
March 2009 (none stated)
Whopping Total of Economic Stimulus 
Packages
Stimulus
Package
Details.com
May 22, 2009
Monaghan,
A.
BoE sees little sign of policy success as 
lending slows
The Daily 
Telegraph 
(London)
July 8, 2009 Brown, G.
Chiefs in plea to Bank of England on 
lending; Economy Birmingham Post
July 21, 2009 Elliott, L.
£125 bn boost for banks fails to jump-start 
business lending
The Guardian 
(London)
August 5, 
2009 Seager, A.
Bank loans to businesses drop by £14.7 
bn
The Guardian 
(London)
November 
16, 2009 Goldman, D. CNNMoney.com's bailout tracker CNN Money
January 8, 
2010 Gandel, S.
Bank Lending is Still Down. Should We 
Be Worried? Time
January 11, 
2010 Inman, P.
Banks fear for their recovery, says CBI: 
Business group's survey sees lending 
likely to fail...
The Guardian 
(London)
February 5, 
2010 (none stated)
Not Easy: The Bank of England is right to 
halt its injection of huge sums into the 
economy
The Times 
(London)
February 8, 
2010
Crowe, D. Central banks to plan tougher controls
Australian 
Financial Review
Table 5: Continued
Date Author Title
Financial Media 
Outlet
February 17, 
2010
Evans- 
Pritchard, A.
US bank lending falls at fastest rate in 
history The Telegraph
February 19, 
2010 Gilmore, G.
Record fall in bank lending to business 
triggers new conven over UK recovery
The Times 
(London)
August 4, 
2010
Groves, J. & 
Duke S.
Our Booming Banks Have to Lend Again, 
says Cameron
Daily Mail 
(London)
August 10, 
2010 Wilson, H. Lending to UK business falls £30bn
The Daily 
Telegraph 
(London)
August 18, 
2010 Delta, S.
Big Banks Loosen Lending Standards: 
Does it Matter Seeking Alpha
October 26, 
2010 Armistead, L. Cameron vows to spur bank lending
The Daily 
Telegraph 
(London)
November
2010 Hall, P. Big banks - Turning the corner? Trade Finance
November 9, 
2010 Harding, R.
U.S. banks see demand for business 
loans drop Financial Times
December 1, 
2010 Isidore, C.
Fed made $9 trillion in emergency 
overnight loans CNN Money
March 31, 
2011
Applebaum, 
B. & McGinty, 
J.
The Fed's Crisis Lending: A Billion Here, 
a Thousand There
The New York 
Times
April 7, 2011 Christie, R.
Back of the Envelope Accounting for the 
Bailout
Bloomberg
BusinessWeek
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Table 5: Continued
Date Author Title
Financial Media 
Outlet
May 2, 2011
Matthews, S. 
& Zumbrun, 
J.
Fed Says Banks Eased Lending Terms, 
Demand for Loans Rose
Bloomberg
BusinessWeek
May 24, 2011 Davison, J. Plea from firms as banks miss targets Evening Gazette
June 14, 
2011 Recap, R.
U.S. Commercial Lending Continues to 
Lag Demand as Banks Recover Slowly Seeking Alpha
August 7, 
2011
Oakeshott, I. 
& Watts, R. Bank gloom deepens over UK economy
The Sunday 
Times (London)
August 22, 
2011
Keoun, B. & 
Kuntz, P.
Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 trillion in 
Secret Loans Bloomberg
August 26, 
2011 Lewis, K. Fed affects banks, rates, prices, and jobs Bankrate.com
September 8, 
2011 Alloway, T. European banks face funding problems Financial Times
October 2, 
2011
Day, I. & 
Watts, R. Euro bank on brink as debt crisis spreads
The Sunday 
Times (London)
October 24, 
2011 Alloway, T.
French financials lead increase in 
borrowing from the ECB Financial Times
November 
27, 2011
Ivry, B., 
Keoun, B., & 
Kuntz, P.
Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 billion 
Undisclosed to Congress
Bloomberg 
Market Magazine
December 
16, 2011 Hall, M. France: Strip UK of its credit rating The Express
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Table 6: Comparison of Loans Requested and Funded, by period
Based on loan-level data from Thomson One database, this study compares 
commercial lending activity during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through 
September 30, 2011 to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through 
September 30, 2006 to determine how commercial banks responded to credit stimuli. 
This table reflects loans requested (i.e. demand for credit) in Panel A, loans funded, 
aggregated (i.e. supply of credit) in Panel B, and loans funded, by region in Panel C.
Panel A -  Loans Reqijested
Stimulus Period 
October 1,2007 - 
September 30,2011
Non-Stimulus Period 
October 1,2002 - 
September 30, 2006
Description Quantity Value ($ mil) Quantity Value ($ mil)
Total of Loans 
Requested 49,053 $24,927,967 50,858 $24,403,071
LESS: Requests from 
Non-Public Entities (33,057) $(13,416,916) (33,375) $(12,692,059)
Net Loans Requested 
from Public Companies 15,996 $11,511,051 17,483 $11,711,012
LESS: Public 
Companies with No 
Tickers (204) $(84,413) (585) $(299,643)
Net Loans Requested 
from Researchable 
Public Companies 15,792 $11,426,638 16,898 $11,411,369
LESS: Denied Loan 
Requests from Public 
Companies (1,747) $(1,988,368) (4,896) $(4,439,892)
Net Loan Requests 
Approved 
by All Lenders for 
Funding to 
Public Companies 14,045 $9,438,270 12,002 $6,971,477
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Table 6: Continued
Panel B - Loans Funded, aggregated
Stimulus Period 
October 1,2007 - 
September 30,2011
Non-Stimulus Period 
October 1, 2002 - 
September 30,2006
Description Quantity Value ($ mil) Quantity Value ($ mil)
Net Loan Requests 
Approved by Ail Lenders 
for Funding to Public 
Companies 14,045 $9,438,270 12,002 $6,971,477
LESS: Portion of Loan 
Requests not Funded $(3,707,566) $(2,678,444)
Total Loans Funded by 
All Lenders 14,045 $5,730,704 12,002 $4,293,033
LESS: Loans funded by 
Lenders/Syndicates of 
Non-US-, Non-France-, 
Non-Germany, and Non- 
U.K.-based financial 
institutions (11,314) $(4,871,870) (9,460) $(3,687,615)
Net Loans Funded by 
U.S.-, France-, 
Germany-and U.K.- 
based Commercial 
Banks 2,731 $858,834 2,542 $605,418
Percentage of Total 
Loans Funded 19.4% 14.3% 21.2% 14.1%
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Table 6: Continued
Panel C - Loans Funded, by region
Description
Stimulus Period 
October 1, 2007 - 
September 30,2011
Non-Stimulus Period 
October 1,2002 - 
September 30, 2006
Quantity Value ($ mil) Quantity Value ($ mil)
Loans Funded by U.S.- 
based Commercial 
Banks
Loans Funded by 
France-, Germany, and 
U.K.-based Commercial 
Banks
Net Loans Funded by 
U.S.- and EU3- based 
Commercial Banks
1,977
754
$670,385
$188,449
1,844
698
$434,790
$170,628
2,731 $858,834 2,542 $605,418
93
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Final Data Sample
After an examination of the net loan requests approved by all lenders to public companies, it 
was determined that loans approved by lenders based in the United States (U.S.) and the 
European Union countries of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) represented 
more than 75% of the lending activity during the two periods of study. Therefore, loans funded 
by commercial banks based in those countries, solely or in syndicates, in both periods are 
included in the final data sample. This table reflects the funding of the 25 U.S.-based and nine 
France- and U.K.-based commercial banks, as well as their subsidiaries, that made loans in 
both periods.
Stimulus Period 
October 1,2007 - 
September 30,2011
Non-Stimulus Period 
October 1,2002- 
September 30,2006
Description
Loans funded 
by U.S.-based 
Commercial 
Banks
Loans funded 
by France-, 
Germany-, and 
U.K.-based 
Commercial 
Banks
Loans funded 
by U.S.-based 
Commercial 
Banks
Loans funded 
by France-, 
Germany-, and 
U.K.-based 
Commercial 
Banks
Quantity 1,977 754 1,844 698
Total Value 
Funded ($ mil) $670,385 $188,449 $434,790 $170,628
Minimum ($ mil) $1.00 $0.48 $1.00 $2.53
Maximum ($ mil) $14,741.00 $8,253.00 $7,575.00 $6,558.00
Average ($ mil) $339.10 $249.93 $235.79 $244.45
Average Time to 
Final Maturity 
(years) 3.42 4.05 3.55 4.50
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Table 8: Denied Uses of Proceeds in Stimulus Period
Though loans were approved during the 2002 through 2006 period with the following list of 12 
items as proposed uses of proceeds, loans with the listed proposed uses were fully denied in 
the 2007 through 2011 period. Figure 7 shows the uses that received full or partial approval.
Aircraft Financing & Airports 
Energy
Export/Import Financing 
Finance Linked-Trade 
Highways/Roads 
Investment in Liquid Assets 
Mortgage Financing 
Other
Payment on Borrowings 
Project Finance 
Public-Private Partnership 
T elecommunications
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Table 9: Scorecard of U.S. Credit Stimuli
This table contains an unofficial “scorecard” of the policy recommendations based on the 
research referenced in this paper compared to the credit stimuli enacted by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve System and government agencies. The highest score for each recommendation is 
1.00. A score of 0.50 was given when the recommendation was partially carried out. Though 
the author of this paper is not aware of whether or not U.S. credit stimuli were determined 
based on the recommendations stated, it is interesting to note that many of the research- 
based ideas were put into place. A simple calculation of 8.50 out of 12 possible points results 
in a 70.83% score for the decision makers on U.S. credit stimuli. Additional stimulus actions 
were taken that were not recommended by the research identified in this paper.
Author(s) Policy Recommendations based on Research U.S. Credit Stimuli Score
Diamond & 
Dybvig (1986)
Preserve the ability for 
banks to create liquidity
Several programs were 
established to provide banks with 
access to short-term credit or 
borrowers with direct liquidity to 
relieve the pressure on the banks. 1.00
Diamond & 
Dybvig (1986) 
and Diamond & 
Rajan (2000)
Retain the safeguards of 
deposit insurance and 
ensure that all deposits are 
covered so that lending can 
increase
Deposit insurance was retained 
and was increased during the 
crisis period from $100,000 to 
$250,000 per depositor, per 
insured bank, for each account 
ownership category. That level of 
coverage was permanently set by 
the Dodd-Frank Act. However, it 
does not cover all deposits
0.50
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Table 9: Continued
Author(s) Policy Recommendations based on Research U.S. Credit Stimuli Score
Diamond & 
Dybvig (1986) 
and Mora (2010)
Counteract the safeguards 
so that banks do not take 
on too much risk
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act was enacted in 2010 to lower 
risks in the U.S. financial system. 1.00
Thakor(1996)
In connection with 
increasing the money 
supply, decrease long-term 
rates more than short-term 
rates to ensure that lending 
can increase
Long-term rates did not decrease 
more than short-term rates; 
Actually, the opposite occurred; 
short-term rates decreased more 
than long-term rates.
0.00
Diamond & 
Rajan (2000)
Ensure that the capital 
infusion is "substantially 
large" to go beyond 
preventing bank runs so 
that lending can increase.
Capital infusion was "substantially 
large", as best as that can be 
defined.
1.00
Zeltkevic (2009) Unclog capital markets so 
that funds are available for 
lending
Capital infusions, purchase of toxic 
assets, and other programs were 
established to "unclog" capital 
markets 1.00
Zeltkevic (2009) Engage in fiscal stimulus to create a demand for lending
The Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008 and the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 are 
two fiscal stimulus actions of the 
U.S. government. 1.00
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Table 9: Continued
Author(s)
Policy 
Recommendations 
based on Research
U.S. Credit Stimuli Score
Mora (2010) Provide direct interventions 
into the markets to increase 
the supply of credit
Programs such as the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
were designed as direct 
interventions 1.00
Mora (2010)
Enhance the supervision 
and regulation of banks 
considered "too big to fail"
The Dodd-Frank Act, as described 
above, as well as the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program (or 
"stress tests") enhanced 
supervision of the largest banks.
1.00
Cole (2012) Increase capital requirements
In 2007, the provisions of Basel II, 
which increased risk-based capital 
requirements and put other 
guidelines in place, were adopted.
1.00
Cole (2012) Reduce the size of the 
largest banks
(No action taken)
0.00
Cole (2012) Encourage the formation of 
new banks
(No action taken)
0.00
Total Score out of 12 points possible 8.50
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Table 10: Summary Statistics of Sample of U.S.-based Commercial Banks
This table provides statistical information about the characteristics and lending activities of the 
25 U.S.-based commercial banks in the study sample. The banks were separated into three 
size categories based on the average of the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus 
and non-stimulus period, respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks 
in each size category for each period. Panel A presents the number of banks in each size 
category and the name of the banks. Panel B provides summary statistics on each size 
category. The statistics on participation in stimulus programs relates to the six stimulus 
programs being tested in this study for which the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury 
Department made detailed participation data available. The change in the number and value 
of loans provides the data for the dependent variable in the regression analysis.
Panel A - U.S.-based Commercial Banks, by size
Description Small - 
less than 
$25 billion
Medium - 
$25 - $400 billion
Large- 
greater than 
$400 billion
Number of Banks 5 16 4
Name of Banks 
(in alpha order)
Bank Of Hawaii Corp. 
BOK Financial Corp.
Cullen Frost Bankers
SVB Financial Group 
UMB Financial Corp.
Bank Of New York Mellon 
Corp.
BB & T Corp.
CIT Group Inc.
Comerica Inc.
Fifth Third Bancorp 
First Horizon National Corp. 
Huntington Bancshares Inc. 
Keycorp
M & T Bank Corp.
Northern Trust Corp.
PNC Financial Services Group 
Regions Financial Corp.
State Street Corp.
SunTrust Banks Inc.
US Bancorp 
Zions Bancorporation
Bank of America 
Corp.
Citigroup Inc.
JP Morgan Chase 
& Co.
Wells Fargo & 
Company
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Table 10: Continued
Panel B - Sample Statistics, by size of bank
Stimulus Period 
October 1,2007 - 
September 30,2011
Non-Stimulus Period 
October 1,2002 - 
September 30,2006
Description
Small - 
less than 
$25 
billion
Medium - 
$25 - $400 
billion
Large - 
greater 
than $400 
billion
Small - 
less 
than 
$25 
billion
Medium
$25-
$400
billion
Large - 
greater 
than $400 
billion
Number of 
Banks 5 16 4 5 16 4
Minimum Total 
Assets ($ mil) $11,586 $28,719 $1,136,729 $5,085 $30,520 $425,729
Maximum 
Total Assets 
($ mil) $23,305 $286,522 $2,030,517 $14,907 $198,623 $1,444,736
Number of 
Stimulus 
Programs of 
Participation
1 5 5 n/a n/a n/a
Number of 
Commercial 
Loan 
Transactions
48 1,048 2,872 16 912 2,728
Value of 
Commercial
Loan
Transactions $2,120 $74,102 $594,163 $364 $58,532 $375,894
($ mil)
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Table 11: Regression Results based on Change in Number of Transactions
The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated 
as the number in the stimulus period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. 
The data for each independent variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P- 
values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.2015 * * -2.9340 -3.0051 -39.7517 ***
[0.0484] [0.4017] [0.3924] [0.0000]
AMLF -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.3963] [0.9547] [0.9167] [0.5751]
CPFF 0.0023 ★ ★ ★ 0.0023 0.0023 *** 0.0024 ***
[0.0062] [0.0046] [0.0049] [0.0008]
CPP 0.0007 * * 0.0008 0.0007 ** 0.0005 **
[0.0122] [0.0146] [0.0265] [0.0840]
SCAP 11.6706 * * * -11.0134 -10.9663 ** -13.1847 ***
[0.0014] [0.0143] [0.0149] [0.0013]
TAF -0.0002 ★ * * -0.0002 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 ***
[0.0087] [0.0046] [0.0058] [0.0059]
Change in 
Deposits 0.0000
Total
Deposits
[0.7881]
0.0001 *** 
[0.0000]
Bank Fixed 
Effects N Y Y Y
Time Fixed 
Effects N Y Y Y
Number of 
Observations 400 400 400 400
R2 0.0779 0.3045 0.3047 0.4325
Adjusted R2 0.0662 0.2183 0.2163 0.3604
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Table 12: Regression Results based on Change in Value ($ mil) Contributed
The dependent variable is the change in the value ($ mil) contributed by each commercial 
bank to the loan. The change in value is calculated as the value in the stimulus period minus 
the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable is 
lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** 
indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 647.81 1316.47 1290.13 -6952.03 ***
[0.0007] [0.1356] [0.1452] [0.0000]
AMLF -0.0186 -0.0140 -0.1675 -0.0291
[0.6450] [0.7089] [0.6611] [0.4028]
CPFF 0.1098 0.1326 0.15202 0.1667
[0.6234] [0.5046] [0.4583] [0.3650]
CPP 0.1494 0.0678 0.0571 0.0065
[0.0481] [0.3871] [0.4916] [0.9286]
SCAP -2042.83 -2766.37 ** -2748.93 ** -3254.00 ***
[0.0354] [0.0145] [0.0154] [0.0020]
TAF -0.0228 -0.0409 ** -0.04331 ** -0.0357 **
[0.1871] [0.0175] [0.0178] [0.0252]
Change in 
Deposits
Total
Deposits
Bank Fixed 
Effects N Y
0.0024
[0.6929]
Y
0.0117 *** 
[0.0000]
Y
Time Fixed 
Effects N Y Y Y
Number of 
Observations 400 400 400 400
r2 0.0269 0.3484 0.3487 0.4438
Adjusted R2 0.0145 0.2677 0.2659 0.3731
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Table 13: Regression Results by Size of Bank
This table reflects the regression results by size of bank. The dependent variable is the 
change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated as the number in the stimulus 
period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent 
variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. The split of the banks by size is shown 
in Table 10. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Small Medium Large
Intercept -0.5852 -11.8589 *** -31.1744 ***
[0.3468] [0.0000] [0.0021]
AMLF n/a -0.0001 -0.0019
[n/a] [0.8060] [0.2550]
CPFF n/a n/a 0.0027 **
[n/a] [n/a] [0.0579]
CPP -0.0027 -0.0013 0.0016
[0.6383] [0.0359] [0.1808]
SCAP n/a -3.4395 0.3664
[n/a] [0.1488] [0.9894]
TAF -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0001
[0.4137] [0.9051] [0.9079]
Total Deposits -0.0003 *** 0.0001 0.0000
[0.0036] [0.0000] [0.8679]
Bank Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of Observations 80 256 64
R2 0.4374 0.4957 0.7732
Adjusted R2 0.2202 0.4154 0.6515
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Table 14: Regression Results by Decrease or Increase in Lending
This table reflects the regression results of the seven commercial banks that had a decrease in 
commercial lending compared to the 18 commercial banks that had an increase in commercial 
lending. The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan transactions, which is 
calculated as the number of transactions in the stimulus period minus those in the non-stimulus 
period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable are lagged one quarter 
to address endogeneity.
P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
Decrease Increase
Intercept -10.1783 *** -44.4935 ***
[0.0003] [0.0000]
AMLF 0.0001 -0.0001
[0.8647] [0.5852]
CPFF n/a 0.0026 ***
[n/a] [0.0017]
CPP 0.0001 ** 0.0003
[0.0169] [0.4891]
SCAP -8.2606 * -15.7019 ***
[0.0956] [0.0035]
TAF -0.0001 -0.0001 **
[0.8094] [0.0369]
Total Deposits 0.0000 *** 0.0001 ***
[0.0011] [0.0000]
Bank Fixed Effects Y Y
Time Fixed Effects Y Y
Number of Observations 112 288
R2 0.4916 0.4310
Adjusted R2 0.3361 0.3441
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Table 15: Event Study Results of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns
This event-study analysis reflects the response of the market during three periods. The “loan 
date” is the date that the loan or stimulus participation was transacted, The “twin period” is the 
range of dates between the transaction date and the date of release of information for the 
application programs. The “release date” is the date that the Federal Reserve Board provided 
participation information to the public. Panel A presents the results according to the Market 
Model. Panel B presents the results according to the Market-adjusted Model.
Panel A - Market Model
Market Model
Program Loan Twin Release
Participants
Non-
Participa
nts
AMLF 28.64% *** 10.70% $ 10.53% * 13.18% * *
(positive: negative) (40:1) (22:19) (4:0) (19:2)
CPFF -11.44% $ -129.96% *** 16.22% *** 11.89% * * *
(positive: negative) (14:17) (6:25) (5:0) (18:2)
CPP -28.89% * n/a n/a n/a
(positive: negative) (6:15)
SCAP 23.14% n/a n/a n/a
(positive: negative) (6:5)
TAF 6.54% $ -26.98% *** 13.70% *** 11.08% ★ ★ ★
(positive: negative) (132:120) (121:131) (14:2) (9:0)
$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance
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Table 15: Continued
Panel B: Market-adjusted Model
Market-adjusted Model
Program Loan Twin Release
Participants
Non-
Participants
AMLF
(positive:
negative)
9.78% *** 45.50% 
(30:11) (36:5)
9.66% * 
(4:0)
6.35%
(17:4)
* * *
CPFF
(positive:
negative)
1.58% $ 
(20:11)
41.70%
(28:3)
9.51% ** 
(5:0)
6.22%
(16:4)
* * *
CPP
(positive:
negative)
-13.27%
(10:11)
n/a n/a n/a
SCAP
(positive:
negative)
35.08% $ 
(10:1)
n/a n/a n/a
TAF
(positive:
negative)
5.93% $ 
(138:114)
48.72%
(209:43)
6.92% ** 
(13:3)
6.80%
(8:1)
* *
$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance
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Table 16: Event Study Results of Bank-Specific Stimulus Efforts
In addition to the general stimuli that was made available to the eligible financial institutions, 
the Federal Reserve Board and government agencies also provided stimuli specifically to 
designated banks for identified purposes. The event-study analysis of those transactions, on 
the date of execution, is provided using both the Market Model and the Market-adjusted Model.
Bank Market Model
Market- 
adjusted Model
JP Morgan & Co., Inc. 
(March 14, 2008)
-17.37% 0.35%
Bank of America Corp. 
(June 5, 2008)
-5.61% -12.98%
Citigroup
(September 29, 2008)
51.06% ** 4.24%
Wells Fargo & Co., Inc. 
(October 12, 2008) 75.02% ** 35.85%
Bank of America Corp. 
(January 16, 2009) -80.53% * -78.94% $
$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance
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Table 17: Summary Statistics of Sample of EU-based Commercial Banks
This table provides statistical information about the characteristics and lending activities of the 
nine EU-based commercial banks in the study sample. The banks were separated into three 
size categories based on the average of the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus 
and non-stimulus period, respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks 
in each size category for each period. Panel A presents the number of banks in each size 
category and the name of the banks. Panel B provides summary statistics on each size 
category. The statistics on participation in stimulus programs relates to the nine stimulus 
programs being tested in this study for which the European Central Bank, Bank of England and 
the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom made detailed participation 
data available. The change in the number and value of loans provides the data for the 
dependent variable in the regression analysis.
Panel A - EU-based Commercial Banks, by size
Description
Number of 
Banks
Name of Banks 
(in alpha order)
Small
Commerzbank AG
Lloyds Banking 
Group
Standard Chartered 
Bank PLC
Medium
Barclays PLC
Credit Agricole 
Corporate and 
Investment Bank
Societe Generale SA
Large
BNP Paribas SA
Deutsche Bank
The Royal Bank 
of Scotland Group 
PLC
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Table 17: Continued
Panel B - Sample Statistics, by size of bank
Stimulus Period Non-Stimulus Period
October 1,2007 - 
September 30, 2011
October 1, 2002 - 
September 30, 2006
Description
Small - 
less than 
$1.50 
trillion
Medium - 
$1.50- 
$2.50 
trillion
Large - 
greater 
than $2.50 
trillion
Small - 
less than 
$750 
billion
Medium - 
$750 
billion - 
$1,225 
trillion
Large - 
greater 
than 
$1,225 
trillion
Number of 
Banks 3 3 3 3 3 3
Minimum 
Total Assets 
($ mil) $461,341 $1,526,109 $2,668,650 $171,956 $ 874,562 $1,237,338
Maximum 
Total Assets 
($ mil) $1,205,427 $2,472,935 $2,886,150 $560,531 $1,201,596 $1,294,443
Number of 
Stimulus 
Programs of 
Participation
6 3 6 n/a n/a n/a
Number of 
Commercial 
Loan 289 376 608 214 404 458
Transactions
Value of 
Commercial 
Loan 
Transactions 
($ mil)
$ 32,745 $ 58,538 $ 97,166 $31,779 $ 58,177 $ 80,672
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Table 18: Regression Results based on Change in Number and Value ($ mil) of Loans
This table presents regression models using both the change in the number of loan 
transactions (columns (1) and (2)) and the change in the value ($ mil) contributed (columns (3) 
and (4)) as the dependent variable. In addition, columns (2) and (4) add the participation in 
U.S, Federal Reserve credit stimuli to the model. The data for each independent variable is 
lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** 
indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
ID  ___(2)____________0)  (41
Intercept -1.5094 -1.7100 829.0687 738.8213
[0.5734] [0.5394] [0.2160] [0.2876]
EU Credit Stimuli:
SubDebtFR 0.0003 0.0003 0.0899 0.1353
[0.7231] [0.7385] [0.7055] [0.5879]
CapinjectUK 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0462 -0.0431
[07621] [0.8177] [0.5248] [0.5612]
ConversionUK -0.0005 -0.0003 0.6202 0.5170
[0.8144] [0.8807] [0.2207] [0.3409]
RecapUK 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0315 -0.0154
[0.2983] [0.3055] [0.9041] [0.9536]
SLSUK 0.0000 ** 0.0000 " 0.0041 * 0.0041
[0.0243] [0.0236] [0.0813] [0.0817]
StressTestECB -1.0816 -0.9202 -60.3721 -20.4361
[0.8800] [0.8988] [0.9730] [0.9909]
Total Deposits 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0011
[0.9032] [0.8893] [0.3207] [0.3184]
US Credit Stimuli:
CPFFUS
TAFUS
Bank Fixed 
Effects Y
-0.0001
[0.8973]
0.0000
[0.6605]
Y Y
0.0496
[0.5469]
0.0002
[0.9920]
Y
Time Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of 
Observations 144 144 144 144
R2 0.4725 0.4734 0.3629 0.3654
Adjusted R2 0.3325 0.3216 0.1938 0.1825
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Table 19: Regression Results by Size of Bank
This table reflects the regression results by size of bank. The dependent variable is the 
change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated as the number in the stimulus 
period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent 
variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. The split of the banks by size is shown 
in Table 17. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Small_________  Medium_______ Large
Intercept 7.5642 ** 2.0368 6.0046
[0.0558] [0.5962] [0.2736]
EU Credit Stimuli:
SubDebtFR n/a 0.0021 -0.0021
CapinjectUK 0.0000
[0.4436]
n/a
[0.3106]
n/a
Conversion UK
[0.9142]
n/a n/a n/a
RecapUK -0.0056 0.0022 -0.0001
[0.5947] [0.5207] [0.7468]
SLSUK 0.0000 n/a 0.0000
StressTestECB
[0.2616]
2.6061 n/a
[0.2047]
n/a
Total Deposits
[0.7333]
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.7805] [0.6793] [0.3918]
US Credit Stimuli: 
CPFFUS -0.0033 0.0000 0.0000
[0.4749] [0.9696] [0.5027]
TAFUS 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.5520] [0.7564] [0.4244]
Bank Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of 
Observations 48 48 48
R2 0.6479 0.6239 0.5745
Adjusted R2 0.2805 0.2930 0.1667
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Table 20: Regression Results by Decrease or Increase in Lending
This table reflects the regression results of the four EU-based commercial banks that had a 
decrease in commercial lending (column (1)) compared to the five that had an increase in 
commercial lending (column (2)). The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan 
transactions, which is calculated as the number of transactions in the stimulus period minus 
those in the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable 
are lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and 
*** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Decrease Increase
Intercept 3.0210 10.1341
[0.3176] [0.0195]
EU Credit Stimuli: 
SubDebtFR 0.0004 -0.0016
[0.4325] [0.2900]
CapinjectUK -0.0002 n/a
Conversion UK
[0.4325]
0.0010 n/a
RecapUK
[0.6037]
n/a 0.0006
SLSUK 0.0000
[0.7437]
n/a
StressTestECB
[0.1254]
n/a -1.1447
Total Deposits 0.0000
[0.8836]
-0.0001
[0.2956] [0.1106]
US Credit Stimuli: 
CPFFUS -0.0004 -0.0007
[0.3376] [0.3288]
TAFUS 0.0000 -0.0001
[0.9631] [0.8557]
Bank Fixed Effects Y Y
Time Fixed Effects Y Y
Number of Observations 64 80
R2 0.6985 0.4493
Adjusted R2 0.5002 0.1943
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Figure 1: History of U.S., EU, and U.K. Central Bank Rate Movement
This figure shows the movement of the key lending rates of the U.S., EU, and U.K. central 
banks during the period of October 2006 through September 2012 to show the rates prior to 
stimulus actions and more recently. In Panel A, it is seen that the U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
took its first action in August 2007 and continued to reduce rates from a spread of 1.00% to as 
low as 0.25% before settling on a spread of 0.50%. In Panel B, the graph reflects the initial 
increase in rates by the European Central Bank (ECB), in an effort to maintain price stability, 
before reducing rates in October 2008, more than one year after the Federal Reserve reduced 
its key rates. Panel C reflects the movement of the official bank rate of the Bank of England, 
the central bank of the U.K. At the end of the charted period, all three central banks show very 
low rates.
SOURCES: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html and 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/pages/iadb/notesiadb/wholesale_baserate.aspx
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Figure 1: Continued
Panel B: EU - European Central Bank Rate Movement
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Figure 1: Continued
Panel C: U.K. - Bank of England Central Bank Rate Movement
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
Rate
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Month
Official Bank Rate
115
Figure 2: Effects of Expansionary Monetary Policy
This figure shows the effects of expansionary monetary policy on the goods market (IS) and the 
money market (LM), which represent the Mundell-Fleming Model (i.e. the IS/LM curve for open 
economies). According to Mankiw (2010) and classical economic theory, the increase in the 
money supply, as brought on by expansionary monetary policy, results in a shift of the LM curve 
to the right to reflect the increase in income. This increase in income leads to a fall in real 
interest rates, which is designed to spur net capital outflow by way of bank lending.
(b) Net Capital Outflow
Real interest 
rate, r
2 .. .. lowers 
the interest 
rote, ...
3 .. . .  which 
increases net 
capital 
outflow, . . .
Yj Income, 
output, Y
Cf,T*CF, Net capital
— . outflow,
Source: Mankiw (2010, p. 376)
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Figure 3: Commercial Loans funded by U.S.-based Commercial Banks, 
by year
Based on the commercial loans funded by U.S.-based commercial banks, the number of 
loans, loan value in millions of dollars, and average loan size during the stimulus period 
exceeded that of the non-stimulus period after fiscal period two. Panels A, B, and C below 
show this result graphically.
Panel A - Number of Loans, by year
NOTE: Each period is designated by the dates identified in the table shown:
Stimulus Period Non-Stimulus Period
Period 2007 - 2011 2002 - 2006
1 Oct 2007 - Sept 2008 Oct 2002 - Sept 2003
2 Oct 2008 - Sept 2009 Oct 2003 - Sept 2004
3 Oct 2009 - Sept 2010 Oct 2004 - Sept 2005
4 Oct 2010 - Sept 2011 Oct 2005 - Sept 2006
Number of Loans, by year
800
729
641
600
S  458Number of 
Loans 405542
400
389
329328
200
1 2 3 4
Annual Periods 
2007-2011 — — 2002-2006
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Figure 3: Continued
Panel B - Total Loan Value, by year
Total Loan Value, by year
($ mil)
$300,000
284,255
$250,000
$200,000 $166,324
$150,000 $97,339 142,890$149,677$100,000
$86,619$95,988 $83.827$50,000
2 3
Annual Periods
•2007-2011 •2002 - 2006
Panel C - Average Loan Size, by year
($ mil)
Average Loan Size, by year
$500.00
33.46$400.00
$352.82$276.16
$300.00 $246.7i
$263.28$255.57$200.00
$228.15 $212.53
$100.00
2 3
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Figure 4: Commercial Loans funded by France-, Germany, and U.K.-based 
Commercial Banks, by year
Based on the number of loans, loan value in millions of dollars, and average loan size, the 
panels below show that there was less activity in Period 4 of the stimulus period (i.e. 2007 - 
2011) than in the non-stimulus period (i.e. 2002-2006) for the commercial loans funded by 
France-, Germany-, and U.K.-based commercial banks.
NOTE: Each period is designated by the dates identified in 
the table shown:
Stimulus Period Non-Stimulus Period
Period 2007 - 2011 2002 - 2006
1 Oct 2007 - Sept 2008 Oct 2002 - Sept 2003
2 Oct 2008 - Sept 2009 Oct 2003 - Sept 2004
3 Oct 2009 - Sept 2010 Oct 2004 - Sept 2005
4 Oct 2010 - Sept 2011 Oct 2005 - Sept 2006
Panel A - Number of Loans, per year
Number 
of Loans
Number of Loans, per year
250 224 203187 214200
158 .150 169161
136
100
2 3
Annual Periods
•2007-2011
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Figure 4: Continued
Panel B - Total Loan Value, per year
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$60,000 
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$-
Total Loan Value, by year
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Panel C - Average Loan Size, per year
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Figure 5: Global Approved versus Denied Loan Requests from 
Public Companies
Based on the value of the loans, per Table 6, more loan requests from public companies were 
approved in the 2007-2011 stimulus period than in the 2002-2006 non-stimulus period. In the 
period of 2002 through 2006, 61 % of the loans requested were approved. However, in the 
period of 2007 through 2011, during which credit stimuli were in place, the approval 
percentage increased to 83% of the loans requested.
Panel A - Stimulus Period of October 2007 through September 2011
Loans Approved versus Denied, by loan value 
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
Denied Requests 
17%Approved 
Requests 
83% "
Panel B -Non-Stimulus Period of October 2002 through September 30,2006
Loans Approved versus Denied, by loan value 
October 1,2002 - September 30,2006
Denied Requests 
39%
Approved
Requests
61%
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Figure 6: Top Five Home Countries of Loan Requestors
U.S.-based lenders were faced with requests for funds from companies in 63 countries during 
the 2007-2011 period and from 72 countries during the 2002-2006 period. The resulting 
commercial loans in both periods were provided primarily to companies based in the U.S.
Panel A - Top Five Home Countries during period of October 2007 - September 2011
Top Five Home Countries 
of Loan Requestors 
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
□ U.S.-funded Borrower Denied Requestor
United States 
United Kingdom 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
Canada 
Australia
3.33%
71.32%
55.00%
6i82%
24.74%
0.00%
28.68%
96.67%
45.00%
33 .18%
75.26%
100.00%
Panel B - Top Five Home Countries during period of October 2002 - September 2006
Top Five Home Countries 
of Loan Requestors 
October 1,2002 - September 30,2006
□ U.S.-funded Borrower a Denied Requestor
United States 
United Kingdom 
India 
France 
Canada 
Australia
)
41.89%
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Figure 7: Industries of Loan Requestors
As U.S.-based lenders made decisions on lending to commercial entities, some industries 
received more funding than others. Per Panel C, the net approval rate for the utilities, money, 
and other industry groupings was lower than that of any other industries.
Panel A - Industries of Loan Requestors - October 2007 - September 2011
Industries of Loan Requestors 
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
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Figure 7: Continued
Panel B - Industries of Loan Requestors - October 2002 - September 2006
Industries of Loan Requestors 
October 1,2002 - September 30,2006
100.00% ------------------------------------------------------------------
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Figure 7: Continued
Panel C - Net Approval Rate over the Two Periods
Net Approval Rate 
over the Two Periods
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Figure 8: Net Loan Approval Rates based on Proposed Uses of Proceeds
In the period of 2007-2011, U.S.-based lenders evaluated loan requests with 42 proposed 
uses of the proceeds. Panel A shows the 14 uses that experienced a positive net loan 
approval rate. Panel B shows the 16 uses that experienced a negative net loan approval rate. 
Table 8 shows the list those proposed uses of loan proceeds that were fully denied during the 
2007-2011 period.
Panel A - Proposed Uses of Proceeds with Positive Net Loan Approval Rates
Proposed Uses of Proceeds with 
Positive Net Loan Approval Rates 
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
100%
Proposed Use of Proceeds
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Figure 8: Continued
Panel B - Proposed Uses of Proceeds with Negative Net Loan Approval Rates
Net
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Figure 9: Lending Standards, 1991 -2011
According to the October 2011 Senior Lending Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending 
Practices, produced by the Federal Reserve System, the net percentage of banks (i.e. 
domestic respondents) reported that they primarily loosened lending standards during the non­
stimulus period while the stimulus period saw greater net tightening followed by reduced 
tightening.
Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Commercial and Industrial Loans
D"~int
Stimulus
Period
100Non-Stimulus
Period
Loans to large and middle-market firms 
Loans to small firms f
1991 1993 1997 1999 20051995 2001 2007 2009 2011
Source:http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201111/default.htm
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Figure 10 - Stock Price Trend of EU-based Commercial Banks, by country
This figure provides a visual depiction of the market’s reaction to the nine commercial banks in 
the sample of this study. Panel A shows the stock price trend of the France-based commercial 
banks that trade on the Euronext Paris stock exchange. Panel B shows the stock price trend 
of the Germany-based commercial banks that trade on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Panel C 
shows the stock price trend of the United Kingdom-based commercial banks that trade on the 
London stock exchange. Each panel presents the stock prices on the trading days during the 
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011.
Panel A - France-based Commercial Banks
Stock Price Trend of France-based Commercial Banks 
October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011
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Figure 10: Continued
Panel B - Germany-based Commercial Banks
Stock Price Trend of Germany-based Commercial Banks 
October 2, 2007 - September 30, 2011
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APPENDIX A: Endnotes
1 The period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 is being identified as the 
“non-stimulus” period because the timeframe contained substantially fewer programs for 
depository institutions than the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 
2011. For example, the author is aware that the non-stimulus period included changes to 
the discount window program in 2003 that added primary credit and secondary credit 
programs to this overnight-only lending facility. However, the discount window’s terms 
were extended on primary credit loans to up to 30 days in August 2007 and was further 
extended to up to 90 days in March 2008. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2010). In 
addition to the expanded benefits of the discount window program, the stimulus period 
includes multiple new policy innovations to aid depository institutions through the 2008 
financial crisis. Therefore, the periods are designated as stimulus versus non-stimulus 
based on the differences in benefits to the banks and the increased quantity of programs 
in the stimulus period.
2The findings from the GAO Audit of the Federal Reserve System’s programs are outside 
of the scope of this research. For further information, the full report can be found at 
http://www.gao.gov/new. items/d 11696.pdf.
3The author is aware that the sources of funds for commercial lending are only one aspect 
of the determinants of bank lending. Other determinants include the demand for lending, 
lending standards, etc. However, given the focus of this paper on whether or not the credit 
stimuli was able to incentivize the banks to lend, it is appropriate to address the 
determinants of lending for which the central banks and government agencies could 
influence. Those determinants are the source of funds available for commercial lending.
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APPENDIX A: Continued
4lt must be noted that, the majority of the referenced studies were based on the 
requirements of Basel I, that went into effect in 1988. Basel I was superseded by Basel 
II in 2004. On July 20, 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
issued a joint press release with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision stating their agreement in 
implementing Basel II in the United States with the goals of consistency with international 
approaches and sensitivity to risks. (Board, 2007) Basel II set forth a "three pillar" 
framework that encompassed risk-based capital requirements for credit risk, market risk, 
and operational risk (Pillar 1); supervisory review of capital adequacy (Pillar 2); and market 
discipline through enhanced public disclosures (Pillar 3). Given that Basel II was adopted 
by the Federal Reserve at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, it is believed that its 
impacts are more stringent and reflected in the lending decisions of our sample of banks 
with the anticipated same impact on lending as the capital requirements of Basel I.
5Eventus software, via SAS, was used to generate the event study results under the 
Market Model and the Market-adjusted Return Model.
though the overall change in the commercial lending activity of the EU3 is an increase, it 
must be noted that the data for the four commercial banks of the U.K. shows a decrease in 
commercial lending when the stimulus period is compared to the non-stimulus period.
That decrease of $7.7 billion reduces the $25 billion of increases in lending by France and 
Germany to the $18 billion net increase that results.
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